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ABSTRACT

An Analysis o f the Differential Power o f the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2

by
Nicole A. Cavenagh, M.A.
Dr. Douglas Ferraro, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This study examined the ability of the Fake Bad Scale of the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 to differentiate among individuals who have a
traumatic brain injury, individuals with a somatoform disorder, and individuals who are
malingering. Participants were chosen from a pool o f 283 personal injury and workers
compensation cases obtained from an established neuropsychological practice in a major
Southwestern city. Each of these participants was involved in litigation and received a
diagnosis that included traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or malingering.
Complete neuropsychological and psychological test batteries were conducted on each
participant, and the complete medical records for each participant were reviewed. O f the
available cases 30 individuals with a diagnosis of malingering, 31 individuals with a
diagnosis o f a som atoform disorder, and 21 individuals w ith a traumatic brain injury were

selected for analysis.
The first aspect o f the Fake Bad Scale that was examined was its ability to
differentiate among individuals with traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or

111

who are malingering. These data were analyzed utilizing a one-way Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA indicated that the mean Fake Bad Scale scores for
each group were significantly different; thus, a Bonferroni comparison was made. This
comparison demonstrated that the Fake Bad Scale significantly differentiated between
each possible pairwise comparison o f the three groups o f interest in terms of mean score.
The sensitivity and specificity of the Fake Bad Scale were also examined and indicated
that significantly different mean scores did not necessarily imply accuracy of
classification given that the Fake Bad Scale correctly classified individuals with
Somatoform Disorder less than 50 percent of the time.
Next, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was compared to other validity
measures o f the MMPI-2 by using a separate one-way ANOVA for each validity scale of
interest These analyses indicated that the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale each
produced significantly different mean scores for the three groups of interest. Subsequent
Bonferroni comparisons indicated that none of these scales significantly differentiated
between malingerers and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. The sensitivity and
specificity for each MMPI-2 validity scale were also considered, and resulted in the
conclusion that the F(b) Scale provided the most consistent classification of each
diagnostic group.
The final question that was considered was whether there were gender
differences in the ability of the Fake Bad Scale to differentiate among the three groups of
interest. These data were analyzed using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Gender
differences on the Fake Bad Scale were not found.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The diagnosis of malingering, or the feigning of medical or psychological symptoms,
has been a much debated topic in the field o f neuropsychology for many years.

This is

primarily because there is no hard and fast rule regarding what is the best method for
detecting and definitively diagnosing malingering. While nearly any psychological or
medical disorder can be malingered, the disorder of interest in this research is traumatic
brain injury.
Accurate assessments of traumatic brain injury, and the malingering o f traumatic
brain injury, are both important and problematic. They are important because head
injuries are the inost common acute neurological disorder in the United States (Kraus &
Sorenson, 1994), and because litigation in head injury cases can often result in
settlements that run into the millions o f dollars. Thus, there is high motivation for people
to malinger head injuries. The assessment of head injury malingering can be very
problematic due to the fact that there is no “gold-standard” for measures of head injury
malingering, and most of these malingering measures have been developed using normal
participants who are instructed to feign a head injury (e.g. Reitan & Wolfson, 2002). The
problems with this research methodology are fully articulated in the literature review
which follows (cf. Chapter II).

In addition to being important and problematic, accurate assessment of head injury and its
malingering is difficult. One reason for this difficulty is that frequently there are not
accurate records o f an individual’s prior level of functioning (e.g., people rarely have had
prior I.Q. tests to determine cognitive functioning), which are often an important part of
detecting malingering. Another reason for the difficulty in determining malingering of
traumatic brain injury is the fact that on occasion the medical records do not coincide
with the expressed symptomology, as would be the case in a somatization disorder, which
is distinctly different from malingering (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
However, the primary assessment problem in the area of traumatic head injury is that of
differential diagnosis; that is, being able to differentiate among individuals who are
actually experiencing symptoms related to traumatic brain injury and have medical test
results that support the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury, individuals who have a
somatization disorder of some type, and individuals who are, in fact, feigning their
symptoms.
There are many possible measures that can be used to assess malingering as are
reviewed subsequently in Chapter II However, one measure that is the focal point of this
research, and that is commonly used in the detection of malingering, is the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen,
& Kaemmer, 1989). The MMPI-2 consists of ten clinical scales and nine validity scales
(Graham, 2000). There are several other validity indicators on the MMPI-2 as well, one
of which is particularly important in the detection of malingering, namely the Fake Bad
Scale (FBS; Lees-Haley, English, & Glenn, 1991).

The Fake Bad Scale (FBS) was specifically developed as a means to detect
malingering among personal injury litigants (Lees-Haley, English, & Glenn, 1991). There
has been substantial research on the ability of the FBS to detect malingering among
personal injury litigants, which has led to mixed results. For example, while Larrabee
(1998) found that elevations on the FBS, combined with elevations on the
Hypochondriasis and Hysteria elinical scales of the MMPI-2, were indicative of
malingering, other researchers have found that the FBS is more likely to assess general
maladjustment and somatic complaints rather than malingering per se (e.g. Butcher,
Arbisis, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003). Another study has found that the FBS may be superior
at detecting malingering in applied forensic settings but not in more general settings
where litigation is not involved (Greiffenstein, Baker, Axelrod, Gervais, & Peck, 2004).
Inasmuch as the detection and differential diagnosis of malingering is o f considerable
importance, particularly where litigation is involved, and inasmuch as the FBS has been
shown to be inconsistent in its diagnostic efficacy, perhaps due to the various assessment
contexts in which it has been used, it seems appropriate further to investigate the efficacy
of the FBS in detecting malingering and to do so to assess personal injury litigants ,
whieh is the population for whom the FBS was originally designed.
It is the overarching goal o f the present research to utilize data fi-om purported head
injury patients to ascertain the effieacy of the MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale in assessing
malingering and in differentiating bona fide head injury patients from those with
somatization disorder or who were malingering. Essentially, the present research intends
to further examine the validity o f the Fake Bad Scale in terms o f its differential

diagnostic ability among individuals who are malingering, those with a somatoform
disorder, and those who have incurred a traumatic brain injury.
In general, prior research has shown that many individuals who malinger are likely to
portray physical rather than cognitive symptoms (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989;
Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993). However,
this is not necessarily consistent with the known sequelae of traumatic brain injury. For
example, after a mild brain injury, most people will complain of decreased concentration,
memory deficits, headaches, and dizziness (Bigler & Clement, 1997). As brain injuries
increase in severity from moderate to very severe or profound, these same sequelae are
seen with the addition of posttraumatic amnesia, contusions and shearing damage, some
degree o f permanent neurological deficit, and, in the most severe cases, a persistent
vegetative state (Bigler & Clement, 1997). There has been significant controversy
regarding the duration of these sequelae, particularly postconcussion syndrome in mild
head injury cases where there is litigation (Rutherford, 1989; Fisher, 1982; Ewing,
McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980).
Somatoform disorders differ significantly from traumatic brain injuries in their
associated symptomology. These disorders are critical to consider in the differential
diagnosis o f malingering versus traumatic brain injury, particularly given that, as stated
above, many who malinger make physical complaints (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 1989;
Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993). In
general, unlike the sequelae typically associated with traumatic brain injury, the defining
characteristic of a somatoform disorder is a complaint of physical pain. Typically, these
complaints are not fully explained by, or are in excess of what would be accepted due to.

a general medical condition or the direct effects of a substance. Furthermore, these
complaints are not intentionally produced or feigned.
Toward that end, in the subsequent pages a description of traumatic brain injury and
its sequelae will be presented followed by a discussion of somatization disorders. Next,
alternative methods of assessing malingering among potential head injury patients will be
reviewed, followed by an in depth discussion of the MMPI-2 as a tool for diagnosing
malingering. Lastly, the Fake Bad Scale, the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale
o f the MMPI-2 will be reviewed and analyzed for their ability to differentiate among
head injury, somatoform and malingering patient groups. The Fake Bad Scale consists of
several items from the Hypochondriasis and Hysteria Clinical Scales of the MMPI-2
(Larrabee, 1003b). The items on these scales tend to involve illness, disease, and
physical complaints (Groth-Mamat, 1999). As described above, physical complaints may
not play as large o f a role in the diagnosis o f traumatic brain injury as in the diagnosis of
a somatoform disorder or malingering. More simply, physical complaints may not be as
consistent with the sequelae of traumatic brain injury as they are with both somatoform
disorders and malingering. The other MMPI-2 validity scales have all been examined by
previous research and have demonstrated sensitivity to overreporting of symptoms; there
is, in fact, significant empirical literature on the faking of head injury symptoms on the
MMPI and the MMPI-2 (e.g.. Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greiffenstein et
al., 2004; Larrabee, 1998; Berry & Butcher, 1998). Furthermore, analog studies have
suggested that those who are faking and/or potentially exaggerating symptoms of head
injury tend to show elevated MMPI-2 overreporting symptom scales (Berry & Butcher,
1998).

As will emerge from this literature review, the present research was designed more
specifically to address the following hypotheses:
1. It is hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale will successfully differentiate between
individuals with a traumatic brain injuiy and individuals who are malingering and
between individuals with a traumatic brain injuiy and those with a somatoform
disorder, but that the Fake Bad Scale will be less successful at differentiating
between individuals who are malingering and those with a somatoform disorder.
2. It was further hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would be comparable to other
MMPI-2 validity scales as well as to the Portland Digit Recognition Test and the
Test of Memory Malingering when differentiating between traumatic brain
injuries and somatoform disorders as well as between traumatic brain injury and
malingering, but that the Fake Bad Scale would be less successful than other
MMPI-2 validity scales and the above mentioned malingering measures when
differentiating between somatoform disorders and malingering
3. The final hypothesis is that there would not be gender differences in how well the
Fake Bad Scale differentiates between individuals with traumatic brain injury,
individuals with somatoform disorders, and individuals who are malingering.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Head Injury
Head injury is the most common acute neurological disorder in the United States, and
head injuries vary considerably in their severity (Kraus & Sorenson, 1994). Over nine
million new cases o f traumatic brain injury are reported each year (Gouvier, Hayes, &
Smiroldo, 1998), with males aged 16 to 25 years being most at risk (Sorenson & Kraus,
1991). It is estimated that over two million of these cases suffer some degree of
permanent, measurable cerebral damage from the head injury (Goldstein, 1990). Two
types o f head injuries can lead to traumatic brain injuries. A closed head injury (CHI)
occurs when the skull remains intact after the injury, such as when a skull fracture occurs.
Closed head injuries usually occur during motor vehicle accidents, falls, and blows to the
head. With this type of injury there is a greater likelihood of more generalized cerebral
damage (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Penetrating head injuries (PHI) occur when the skull
is perforated or penetrated, such as from a bullet wound. With PHI there is a greater
likelihood of focal brain damage.
Traumatic brain injury can be divided into four categories of severity. Mild brain injury
is characterized by the individual experiencing transient loss of, or alteration in,
consciousness that lasts for no longer than 60 minutes (Bigler & Clement, 1997). There
is a rapid return to the previous level of consciousness. Posttraumatic symptoms of mild

brain injuries include headache, dizziness, poor concentration, and poor memory. Some
data (Wrightson, 1989; Ewing, McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980) indicated that
there is the potential for permanent damage even with a mild brain injury. Moderate
brain injuries typically involve an alteration in consciousness that lasts for more than 60
minutes. In this instance, the potential for a good recovery depends upon whether or not
an individual’s critical systems were involved. Moderate brain injury has the same
posttraumatic symptoms as a mild brain injury, but may also involve posttraumatic
amnesia. Posttraumatic amnesia is the period of time from the trauma to the return of
consistent memory function; if there is a loss of consciousness posttraumatic amnesia
begins when consciousness is regained (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The next level for
brain injuries is a severe brain injury. In the case of a severe brain injury the individual is
immediately incapacitated in terms of his or her ability to follow simple instructions. The
individual may be fully comatose. Motor deficits and pathological reflexes are present.
With severe brain injuries, posttraumatic amnesia usually lasts from one to seven days,
but can last even longer. Brain contusions and shearing damage to white matter are
common with these injuries, and some degree of permanent neurological deficit usually
persists (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The final, and most severe, category is very
severe/profound brain injury. With this level of injury the individual is unconscious and
unresponsive immediately or shortly after the injury. The individual is unable to
communicate and cannot follow simple instructions. Many who suffer profound brain
injuries die within a few minutes of the injury. If the individual survives, a persistent
vegetative state is common; higher cortical functioning is not recovered (Bigler &
Clement, 1997).

Traumatic brain injury is measured using the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS). This scale
is used to evaluate the severity of impairment of function in the very early stages of a
traumatic brain injury (Bigler & Clement, 1997). The Glasgow Coma Scale is a 15-point
scale that measures functioning in terms of: eye opening, from no eye opening even in
response to pain to spontaneous eye opening; motor response, from inability to move to
ability to follow simple instructions; and verbal response, from no response to normal
orientation to person, place, and time (Teasdale and Jennett, 1976, 1974). Scores range
from 3 to 15, with lower scores indicating poorer functioning. Glasgow Coma Scale
scores of 8 and lower are associated with severe head injury, scores between 9 and 12
with moderate head injury, and scores between 13 and 15 with mild head injury.
There are many factors involved in a traumatic brain injury. The first is the impact of
the injury itself. The impact of the injury can range from a simple bump on the head to a
skull fracture or penetrating head injury, with the risk for traumatic brain injury
increasing with the impact of the injury. There are also clearly identified signs and
symptoms associated with traumatic brain injuries. The presence or absence of a
subdural hematoma also is a factor in traumatic brain injury. Approximately 30 percent
of individuals who suffer a severe closed head injury will develop subdural hematomas
(Genarelli, 1990). Those who develop subdural hematomas suffer greater cerebral
atrophy, especially in frontal regions, and greater ventricular dilation (Cullum & Bigler,
1985). Additionally, these individuals perform more poorly on neuropsychological
measures, especially memory tests, than those who had closed head injuries but did not
develop a subdural hematoma (Cullum & Bigler, 1986). Acute subdural hematomas are
associated with a mortality rate o f above 60 percent (Eisenberg & Weiner, 1987). A third

factor in traumatic brain injury is increasèd intracranial pressure. This can cause damage
to brain tissue, and, in very severe cases, herniation of the medulla through the foramen
magnum (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Increased intracranial pressure can be caused by
hemorrhaging that leads to a hematoma and by cerebral edema that causes brain swelling.
Anoxia, or insufficient oxygen to the brain, results in severe neuronal damage very
quickly and can produce devastating and widespread effects on the brain. Whether or not
anoxia occurs is an important factor in traumatic brain injury.
Posttraumatic degenerative changes can also impact traumatic brain injured
individuals. Over the course of time after a traumatic brain injury, axons that were
injured at the time o f impact will degenerate. This results in the diffuse wasting of key
white matter tracts. For example, if this occurs in the ventricles, the result can be
ventricular system dilation (Bigler & Clement, 1997). Several studies have indicated that
this occurrence is one o f the most sensitive indicators of pathological central nervous
system changes (Bigler, 1990; Johnson, Bigler, Burr, & Blatter, 1994; Cullum & Bigler,
1996; Levi, Guilburd, Lemberger, Soustiel, & Feinsod, 1990; Massman, Bigler, Cullum,
& Naugle, 1986). Related to posttraumatic degenerative changes is another factor in
traumatic brain injury, hydrocephalus. When brain tissue degenerates cerebrospinal fluid
expands to fill the space, resulting in hydrocephalus ex vacuo (Bigler & Clement, 1997).
After a traumatic brain injury, other types of hydrocephalus may develop, including an
impaired flow o f cerebrospinal fluid and normal pressure hydrocephalus (Fishman, 1978;
Jennett & Teasdale, 1981). Other factors related to traumatic brain injury include
posttraumatic epilepsy, which affects between 5 and 30 percent of those who suffer head
injuries, and cranial nerve damage (Bigler & Clement, 1997).
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Sequelae of Traumatic Brain Injury
Other aspects o f traumatic brain injury that must be considered in the diagnostic
process are the neuropsychological sequelae of moderate and severe head injuries,
including cognitive, emotional, and executive functioning, postconcussion syndrome, and
cognitive rehabilitation. These are critical factors because they can provide significant
insight into the individual’s current level of functioning, which then can be compared to
the individual’s prior level of functioning in order to determine the severity of decline
since the injury. In the case of cognitive sequelae, neuropsychologists must determine
the length of the loss o f consciousness as well as the length of posttraumatic amnesia. In
general, the longer the length o f the posttraumatic amnesia, the greater is the likelihood
that the individual will have lasting cognitive deficit and failure to return to his or her
pre-injury level o f employment (Paniak, Shore, Rourke, Finlayson, & Mostacalis, 1992).
Individuals with moderate to severe closed head injuries typically have difficulty with
most measures of cognitive fimctioning. As early as 1942, Goldstein indicated that
patients with diffuse damage, like what is suffered with a moderate to severe closed head
injury, generally have deficits in speed of performance and sustained attention along with
most other measures o f cognitive functioning. Another key area o f deficit that must be
evaluated in head-injured individuals is memory. Significant memory deficits are
common in those who have suffered a traumatic brain injury, and these individuals
should be assessed for both retrograde and anterograde memory deficits.
Emotional and executive functioning must also be considered in terms of level of
functioning both pre- and post-injury when assessing patients who have suffered a
moderate to severe closed head injury. However, many of the commonly used measures

II

o f emotional disturbance are not appropriate for individuals with a traumatic brain injury.
For example, when given the MMPI, traumatic brain injured populations typically have
elevated scores on Scales 2 (Depression), 8 (Schizophrenia), 1 (Hypochondriasis), 3
(Hysteria), and 7 (Psychasthenia; Leininger, Kreutzer, & Hill, 1991; Alfano, Neilson,
Panniak, & Finlayson, 1992). Additionally, Gass and Russell (1991) further examined
this population’s performance and found that on the Depression scale most complaints
were of mental dullness and physical problems. Gass and Russell (1991) also found that
on other elevated scales the primary complaints were of a physical or cognitive nature.
So, while it is important to assess for emotional distress and personality changes in those
who have suffered traumatic brain injury, clinicians must be aware that elevations on
commonly used measures may be more indicative of cognitive and physical, rather than
affective, complaints. According to Jennett and Teasdale (1981), there are three primary
areas o f personality change that should be assessed in individuals with a moderate to
severe head injury. These are drive, affective change, and deficits in executive
functioning. With regard to drive, these individuals typically experience diminished
drive, with the patient lacking initiative and having diminished motivation and interest.
Affective changes are also common, with emotional lability being a frequent complaint.
Lastly, deficits in executive functioning, such as judgment and social restraint, often
result in impulsivity, a lower frustration tolerance, and an impaired sense of what is
socially acceptable. Smaller subsets of those with traumatic brain injuries develop more
significant psychological disorders, such as major depression, mania, bipolar disorder,
and schizophrenia-like symptoms (Fedoroff et al, 1992; Jorge et al., 1993; Zwil,
McAllister, Cohen, & Halpem, 1993; Buckley et al., 1993).
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Postconcussion syndrome is a third important factor in head injury cases. After
sustaining a head injury, particularly a mild head injury, most people complain of
headache, dizziness, poor concentration, poor memory, fatigue, and increased irritability
(Bigler & Clement, 1997). There is significant controversy regarding ho^v long these
symptoms may persist, especially in litigation cases. Hov^ever, some studies do indicate
that even very mild head injuries can result in significant damage (Rutherford, 1989;
Fisher, 1982; Ewing, McCarthy, Groenwall, & Wrightson, 1980).
After considering each of these factors in cases o f traumatic brain injury, the next step
in the diagnostic process is to determine the potential for cognitive rehabilitation. This
aspect can have special importance in head injury litigation in terms of the amount of
compensation that occurs for lifetime care. There is a clearly identified
neuropsychological progression of recovery (Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998).
Several studies indicate that it is possible for significant rehabilitation of cognitive
functioning to occur in individuals who have suffered traumatic brain injuries (Goldstein
& Oakley, 1985; Incagnoli & Newman, 1985; Prigatano, 1986; Franzen & Harris, 1993).
Despite the fact that some deficits will be permanent, especially when significant
structural abnormalities are present, areas of strength and/or intact functioning can be
used as a basis for the individual to adapt to or compensate for the deficit (Prigatano,
1986; Sbordone, 1984).
Once the nature and symptomology of traumatic brain injury are understood, it
follows that symptoms o f other disorders, that may resemble traumatic brain injury, must
also be considered in order to be sure an accurate differential diagnosis is made. This is
especially important in litigation cases where a differentiation must be made between
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traumatic brain injury, a psychological disorder such as somatization disorder, and
malingering. Along these lines, the Somatoform Disorders must be carefully defined so
that an appropriate diagnosis can be made. The Somatoform Disorders are relevant in
differentiating true head injury from malingering because many individuals who malinger
are likely to portray physical rather than cognitive symptoms (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule,
1989; Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993)

Somatization Disorders
Somatization Disorder, historically known as hysteria or Briquet’s syndrome, is a
multisymptomatic disorder (APA, 2000). This disorder typically begins before the age of
30 and often lasts for many years. It is characterized by pain of a gastrointestinal, sexual,
and/or pseudoneurological nature that is unsubstantiated by lab results. Individuals with
somatization disorder usually describe their complaints in colorful, exaggerated ways but
often lack specific factual information. Additionally, there are often inconsistencies in
the history o f complaints, and these individuals often seek treatment from multiple
physicians at the same time. Anxious and depressive symptoms are common as are
impulsive and/or antisocial behaviors, suicide threats and/or attempts, and marital
discord. Somatization Disorder affects between .2% and 2% of women and less than .2%
of men (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for somatization disorder
include the following:
•

History o f many physical complaints beginning before 30 years of age that
occur over several years and result in treatment seeking behaviors or
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significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
function
•

Four Pain Symptoms: history of pain in at least four different areas or
functions, e.g., head, back, joints, abdomen, extremities, chest, rectum,
during menstruation, sexual intercourse, or urination

•

Two Gastrointestinal Symptoms: other than pain, e.g., nausea, bloating,
vomiting, etc.

•

One Sexual Symptom: other than pain, e.g., sexual indifference, erectile
dysfunction, irregular menses

•

One Pseudoneurological Symptom: suggesting a neurological condition
not limited to pain, e.g., conversion symptoms, paralysis or localized
weakness, hallucinations, loss of touch or pain sensation, double vision,
amnesia, etc.

•

Either of these:
o

After appropriate examination, each of the above symptoms cannot
be fully explained by a known general medical condition or by the
direct effects of a substance

o

When there is a related medical condition, the complaints are in
excess of what would be expected

•

Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering

The final DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criterion for somatization disorder is what clearly
separates it from a diagnosis o f malingering. The remaining criteria, particularly the lack
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o f medical findings to support complaints, separate somatization disorder from traumatic
brain injury.
A second disorder that falls under the umbrella of Somatoform Disorders is
Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder. This disorder is characterized by unexplained
physical complaints for at least six months that do not meet criteria for Somatization
Disorder and by an unpredictable course. Young women of low socioeconomic status are
most frequently afflicted, but the disorder is not limited to one gender, age, or
sociocultural group. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for Undifferentiated
Somatoform Disorder are:
•

One or more physical complaints: fatigue, loss of appetite, gastrointestinal, or
urinary complaints

•

Either of these:
o

After appropriate examination, each of the above symptoms cannot be
fully explained by a known general medical condition or by the direct
effects o f a substance

o

When there is a related medical condition, the complaints are in excess of
what would be expected

•

Symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in various functions

•

Symptoms last for at least six months

•

Symptoms are not better accounted for by another mental disorder

•

Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering

Like Somatization Disorder, Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder is clearly
differentiated from both traumatic brain injury and malingering.
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Conversion Disorder consists of unexplained symptoms or deficits that affect
voluntary motor or sensory function. These symptoms or deficits are usually suggestive
of a neurological or general medical condition (APA, 2000). Additionally, psychological
factors are typically associated with the symptoms or deficits. An important feature of
Conversion Disorder is termed ‘La Belle Indifference’, which means that most people
who suffer from Conversion Disorder may present with either a relative lack of concern
about the nature or implications of the symptoms or may present histrionically. These
patients are often suggestible, and many are from rural populations, of low
socioeconomic status, and have lesser knowledge regarding medical and psychological
concepts. Conversion Disorder is more common in women than in men and, especially in
women, symptoms are more common on the left side of the body. Up to 3% of outpatient
referrals to mental health clinics, and from 1% to 14% of general medical/surgical
inpatients, demonstrate symptoms of Conversion Disorder (APA, 2000). The DSM-IVTR (APA, 2000) criteria for Conversion Disorder are:
•

One or more symptoms or deficits affecting voluntary motor or sensory functions;
these symptoms should suggest a neurological or other general medical condition.

•

Psychological factors are associated with symptoms and/or deficits such that
initiation or exacerbation of the symptoms and/or deficits is preceded by conflicts
or other stressors.

•

Cannot be fully explained by a general medical condition or direct effects of a
substance

•

Causes clinically significant impairment in various areas of functioning
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•

Not limited to pain or sexual dysfunction, does not occur exclusively during the
course of Somatization Disorder, is not better accounted for by another mental
disorder

•

Symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned; not malingering

•

Specific type o f symptom and/or deficit:
o

Motor

o

Sensory

o

Seizures or Convulsions

o

Mixed Presentation

Conversion Disorder can be very difficult to differentiate from malingering due to the
fact that it often closely mimics a neurological or general medical condition.

.

Pain Disorder is also difficult to differentiate from malingering in many cases. The
defining quality of Pain Disorder is that pain is the predominant focus of the clinical
attention (APA, 2000). Psychological factors must have an important role in the onset,
severity, exacerbation, or maintenance of the pain. Individuals who suffer from Pain
Disorder often have severe disruptions to their daily life, such as unemployment,
disability, and family problems. Other potential problems for these patients are the
development o f Iatrogenic Opioid Dependence or Abuse and/or Benzodiazepine
Dependence or Abuse. Pain Disorder can occur at any age, has an unclear prevalence
rate, and is somewhat more common in females than in males. The DSM-IV-TR (APA,
2000) for Pain Disorder includes:
•

Pain in one or more anatomical sites as the clinical focus, with pain being severe
enough to warrant clinical attention.
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•

Pain causes clinically significant distress in various areas of functioning

•

Psychological factors are key in onset, severity, maintenance, or exacerbation of
the pain

•

Symptoms are not intentionally feigned; not malingering

•

Not better accounted for by mood, anxiety, or psychotic disorders, and does not
meet criteria for dyspareunia

•

Subtypes:
o

With Psychological Factors, Acute or Chronic

o

With Both Psychologic^ Factors and a General Medical Condition, Acute
or Chronic

o

With a General Medical Condition

The difficulty in diagnosing Pain Disorder lies in the fact that there may actually be
general medical findings associated with the pain. However, the pain may also be present
in the absence o f objective findings, or the objective findings may be coincidental to the
pain.
The final Somatoform Disorder that relates to malingering is Hypochondriasis. This
is the fear o f having, or the idea that one has, a serious disease based on the person’s
misinterpretation of bodily symptoms or bodily functions. Fears of aging and death are
also common with this disorder as is “doctor-shopping” (APA, 2000). Precursors to the
development o f Hypochondriasis fi-equently include serious illness in childhood and/or
past experience with disease in a family member. The defining characteristic of this
disorder is that neither laboratory findings nor physical examination findings confirm the
individual’s preoccupations. Hypochondriasis has a prevalence rate of 1% to 5% in the
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general population and o f 2% to 7% in primary care outpatients. The DSM-IV-TR (APA,
2000) for Hypochondriasis includes:
•

Preoccupation with the fear or having, or the idea that one has, a serious disease
based upon the person’s misinterpretation o f bodily symptoms or bodily functions

•

This preoccupation persists despite appropriate medical evaluation and
reassurance

•

The belief is not delusional in intensity and is not restricted to a specific
circumstance about appearance

•

Causes clinically significant distress or impairment in multiple areas of
functioning

•

Lasts for at least six months

•

Not better accounted for by GAD, OCD, Panic Disorder, Major Depressive
Episode, Separation Anxiety, or another Somatoform Disorder

•

Specify:
o

With Poor Insight

Hypochondriasis may be somewhat simpler to differentiate from malingering due to the
fact that there are clearly no medical findings associated with the person’s preoccupation.
Additionally, Hypochondriasis is not characterized so much by symptoms as by the fear
o f having symptoms.

Malingering
After having an understanding of traumatic brain injury and the psychological
somatoform disorders that can at times mimic traumatic brain injury, the possibility of
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malingering, or the feigning of medical or psychological symptoms, must be considered
to make an accurate differential diagnosis, particularly in cases where there is a known
possibility for secondary gain such as a lawsuit. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV- Text Revision (APA, 2000) defines malingering as “the intentional production of
false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external
incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial
compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (APA, 2000, p. 739).
Malingering may be conscious or unconscious in terms of the person’s awareness of
motivation, but attempts to falsify test results are always deliberate. Greiffenstein et al.
(2002) add to this definition of malingering by proposing that there may in fact be two
types o f malingering, generalized and domain-specific. They also posit that there may be
three forms o f malingering within these two types; the three forms include psychiatric,
cognitive, and somatic malingering. Somatic malingering is defined by Greiffenstein et
al. (2004) as being domain-specific and “the promotion o f physical illness and weakness
out of proportion to injury characteristic (p. 1598).” There must be a differentiation
between exaggeration due to unconscious factors, inability to cooperate for emotional or
neuropsychological reasons, or the inability to tolerate the stress of normal testing
situations and malingering so that an accurate diagnosis can be made. Iverson et al.
(2002) and Rogers, Sewell, and Ustad (1995) elaborate on this point by defining the
difference between malingering and negative response bias. These researchers concur
that negative response bias applies to exaggerated behavior with no reference to the
motivation for that behavior; thus negative response bias is not necessarily synonymous
with malingering. According to these studies, in order for an individual to be diagnosed
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with malingering, the negative response bias must be caused by the plausible attainment
of some external, secondary gain.
Often malingerers feel justified in their actions rather than seeing it as deception or a
criminal act (Golden & Grier, 1998).

Malingering should be suspected in cases where

there is a medico-legal presentation or in cases where there is a marked discrepancy
between the individual’s claimed stress or disability and the objective findings.
Additional cues for clinicians to be aware o f with regards to potential malingering are a
lack o f cooperation during the diagnostic evaluation and in complying with the prescribed
treatment regimen and the presence of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Malingering
differs from Conversion Disorder and other Somatoform Disorders due to the presence of
intentional symptom production, the obvious, external incentives associated with it, and
the fact that suggestion and/or hypnosis often do not result in symptom relief (Golden &
Grier, 1998).
Historically, the assessment of malingering has been quite difficult for clinicians.
Malingering has traditionally been viewed as a moralistic, simplistic, or simply
behavioral scheme coupled with a conscious desire to obtain money or drugs, to avoid
work or prosecution, or to evade undesirable duties (Cunnien, 1988). Given that any
psychiatric or physical disorder can be malingered, exaggerated, or faked, the diagnosis
o f malingering should be done with care and should take into consideration the presence
of comorbid disorders such as genuine illness. Factitious Disorder, and Conversion
Disorder. One way to differentiate between these potential comorbid disorders and
malingering is that malingering is more often time limited and environmentally
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opportunistic while factitious disorders are more chronic and are typically accompanied
by a history o f prior faked illness and insistence on aggressive treatment (Cunnien, 1988).
According to Sweet (2000), the DSM-IV criteria for malingering can be insufficient
for diagnosis; in fact, if one followed these criteria exactly, many people would be
diagnosed with malingering who were not actually feigning their symptoms. Therefore,
other factors must be considered in the differential diagnosis of this disorder. Moderator
variable are one such factor. Anastasi (1987) defined a moderator variable as any factor
that meaningfully impacts the predictive relationship between other variables. Failure to
consider moderator variables can result in false positive diagnostic conclusions with
regard to brain injury. More importantly, with regard to malingering, failure to consider
these factors could result in a patient seeming “too” impaired in light of the expectations
associated with the alleged neurological condition; this is especially true when variables
such as age and education are ignored.
Sweet (2000) also cites the low incidence of malingering as being key to making an
accurate diagnosis. The vast majority of malingerers seen by neuropsychologists will be
individuals who are involved in worker’s compensation, personal injury, or disability
evaluations. Estimates o f the base rate occurrence of malingering in neuropsychological
populations involved in litigation or ‘benefit seeking’ range from about 7.5 to 15%
(Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993) to 8.5 to 14% (Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, & Powel,
1994) to 18 to 33% (Binder, 1993). Binder and Rohling (1996) found that individuals
with lesser injuries were more likely to be pursuing financial incentives and were also
more likely to display greater impairment.
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The assessment of malingering is further complicated by the fact that malingering is
not typically dichotomous, and it is often accompanied by a selective presentation
(Sweet, 2000). In other words, patients may perform inconsistently, giving their best
ability on some measures while malingering on others. It is critical to remember that
valid performance on some measures does not rule out malingering on others nor does
malingering on some measures rule out valid performance on others. Research has found
that malingerers are often not skilled at developing a credible neuropsychological profile
because the general public does not have a good idea o f what a head injury and its
associated deficits actually entail (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier, Johnson,
Rempel, & Linn, 1993). Due to this lack of knowledge on what types of symptoms to
fake, malingerers may choose many or just particular measures on which to display their
poor effort. These choices are made based upon their own belief system o f what a braininjured individual should look like.
An individual’s degree o f intention and degree of exaggeration also must be
considered in the diagnosis of malingering because without intentionality there cannot be
a diagnosis of malingering and there may be some legitimate symptoms present that
would require treatment that are simply being exaggerated. These can be quite
challenging to measure. Intentionality cannot be determined with complete certainty;
therefore, it is not possible to measure a person’s true degree of intention to malinger.
The degree o f exaggeration can be equally difficult to assess because given more
information about the actual nature of a disorder, subjects are able to more accurately
fake deficits. In fact, most malingerers perform at or well above chance, with only a
small percentage performing significantly below chance (Nies & Sweet, 1994).
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The malingering of variable deficits, the use of multiple strategies, and the presence
of multiple dimensions of insufficient effort further complicate the assessment of
malingering. Memory difficulties are the most frequent complaint of malingerers (Sweet,
2000). However, other commonly malingered deficits include sensory-perceptual, motor,
and cognitive impairments (Binder & Willis, 1992; Mittenberg, Rothole, Russell, &
Heilbronner, 1996). Furthermore, the strategies used to malinger can vary between and
within individuals. Beetar & Williams (1995) suggest that malingerers often use the
following strategies: random responding, intentional wrong responses, delayed
responding, and inattentiveness. Lastly, one must consider the possibility that multiple
dimensions o f insufficient effort may be present. For example, in cases where test
performance cannot be accounted for by brain dysfunction or the presence of moderator
variables, and is significantly worse than, or different from, performance standards
known to be associated with genuine neurological deficits, other psychological disorders
must be considered. In rare cases these disorders would include true depressive
pseudodementia or atypical somatoform disorder. The degree to which individuals will
consent to serious and protracted medical treatment regimens can help to clarify in this
arena. True malingerers will typically not consent to these treatments, while the
treatments are often, in fact, the goal for many individuals with somatoform and/or
factitious disorders (Sweet, 2000).
Additionally, there are many potential sources for these false symptom reports. The
diagnosis of malingering presumes that those who feign or grossly exaggerate
psychological complaints after a head injury are producing these complaints based on
sources other than accurate self-reports (Berry & Butcher, 1998). Some of the possible
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etiologies of false reports include exaggeration of actual experiences, difficulties that
were experienced immediately after the injury but which have since subsided, complaints
“borrowed” from role models (e.g., fellow patients) who have experienced considerable
head injuries, popular media outlets, and health care workers who ask detailed questions
about the presence of commonly experienced head injury symptomology may
inadvertently give information on symptoms that the patient “should be” experiencing.
A final difficulty in the assessment of malingering has to do with the methodology
that is commonly utilized to develop measures of malingering. As stated previously,
there is no one widely accepted, standard measure of malingering, and most measures
designed to detect malingering are developed using normal participants who are
instructed to act as if they have suffered a head injury (Reitan & Wolfson, 2002). There
are multiple problems with this method, the primary one being that college-aged
individuals may not fully comprehend the implications of litigation for a head-injured
individual. Reitan & Wolfson (2002) state that “normal subjects pretending to be brain
damaged share none of the stresses, anxieties, guilt, depression, and desperation
experienced by many litigants whose future financial stability may depend on the
outcome of the neuropsychological examination (p.276).” Thus, the results of these
studies may have limited generalizability. Conversely, research done with clinical
samples may have increased generalizability, but lack the control of the experimental,
analogue setting (Berry et al., 1995).
With so many obstacles to the assessment and diagnosis of malingering, it is not
surprising that some o f these factors are commonly overlooked in the interpretation of
neuropsychological test results from patients with head injuries. One factor that is not
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only commonly overlooked, but is actually not even readily available, is the base rate for
malingering. Base rates are best looked at as the current population prevalence (Gouvier,
Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998). If base rate data were readily available, it is thought that it
would significantly improve the accuracy of malingering diagnoses. Even with tests of
90% accuracy and 15% base rates, the classification of malingering is only slightly better
than chance, and is nowhere near the accuracy that could be achieved using base rates
alone. Problems with base rates can be overcome via history collection, records review,
selecting tests that vary alone a sensitivity continuum, and retrospective self-report and
collateral interviews (Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998).
A second factor that is commonly overlooked in the assessment of traumatic brain
injury and malingering is related to the sequelae of traumatic brain injury. As stated
previously, the general public is surprisingly ignorant to what actually happens in TBI.
Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule (1989) examined the perceptions of college students regarding
symptoms of head injury and whiplash. Most thought that physical symptoms were more
common than cognitive symptoms in mild traumatic brain injuries. It follows, based
upon this study, that people trying to feign mild traumatic brain injury may be more
likely to portray physical symptoms. Gouvier, Presholdt, & Warner (1988) and Wilier,
Johnson, Rempel, & Lirm (1993) further support these data. They found that
misconceptions regarding traumatic brain injury might actually be pathognomonic signs
of malingering when given by a patient or collateral during an interview. Despite these
common misconceptions regarding traumatic brain injury, people can be somewhat
effectively coached to more accurately fake a disorder. According to Wong et al. (1994),
coaching tends to result in more accurately faked complaints. Furthermore, coaching also
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can lead to neuropsychological test results that are more similar to those of real patients
than to those o f naïve malingerers who have not been coached, but still tends to
exaggerate neuropsychological performance deficits (Martin, Bolter, Todd, Gouvier, &
Niccolls, 1993; Martin, Gouvier, Todd, Bolter, & Niccolls, 1992).
A final factor that is often overlooked in the assessment of malingering is the fact that
the symptoms noted after a head injury can also be seen in the general population
(Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988). However, these symptoms are seen at higher
prevalence rates among personal injury claimants who have not sustained
neuropsychological injuries (Lees-Haley & Brown, 1993). Among the most commonly
reported symptoms o f personal injury claimants are anxiety and nervousness (93%);
however, over half o f control subjects complain of these as well (Gouvier, Hayes, &
Smiroldo, 1998). Other common symptoms include memory difficulties and headaches,
hoth of which are found at similar frequencies between personal injury claimants and
controls.
Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) offer guidelines to overcome the difficulties that
are often associated with the detection qf malingering. The authors’ suggested diagnostic
criteria include psychometric, behavioral, and collateral data that are indicative of
possible, probable, and definite malingering.
As stated previously, there are many limitations to the DSM-IV criteria for the
diagnosis o f malingering. The DSM-IV has defined malingering as “the intentional
production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms,
motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining
financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs” (American
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Psychological Association, 1994, p.683 as quoted on p.546 of Slick, Sherman, & Iverson,
1999). According to the authors, volition is critical in the DSM-IV definition of
malingering as is the nature of the incentives. Volition is defined as conscious, self
directed behavior by Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999). These two concepts are
important because they help to differentiate between other clinical disorders that involve
symptom exaggeration and/or fabrication. As stated in the article, the use of
dichotomous criteria (e.g. external versus psychological incentives, volitional versus
unconscious behavior) is easy when it is written into definitions, but it is not quite as
clear in clinical practice to determine to what degree a behavior is volitional.
Furthermore, it can also be very difficult to determine which incentive is primary in cases
where there are both external and internal incentives. An example provided by the
authors involves the comorbidity o f malingering and factitious disorder. According to
the DSM-IV, such comorbidity is impossible, but there is no justification provided for
this in spite o f the fact that psychological and financial incentives often co-exist and
behavior can also be motivated by both internal and external incentives. These
limitations have inspired several clinicians and researchers to develop alternative
definitions and criteria for the diagnosis of malingering.
Rogers (1990) developed one possible set of specific diagnostic criteria for the
malingering o f psychiatric disturbance. These criteria involved multiple sources o f data
fi-om across several domains, which included self-report, test scores, behavioral
observations, and collateral information. His specific criteria included the endorsement
o f an unusually high number of rare symptoms, contradictory collateral information, and
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evidence o f exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms from standardized tests. However,
no data have been reported on the reliability, validity, or utility o f these criteria.
Greiffenstein et al. (1994) developed a set of criteria for the diagnosis o f ‘overt’
malingering o f memory dysfunction. These criteria were specifically designed for use in
neuropsychological settings, especially for use with postconcussive patients who were
litigating. The four criteria are as follows; “improbably poor performance on two or
more neuropsychological measures, total disability in a major social role, contradiction
between collateral sources and symptom history, and remote memory loss” (p.547).
Multiple studies (Greiffenstein et al., 1994; Greiffenstein, Gola, & Baker, 1995) were
able to show clinically significant associations between classifications made using their
index and scores on malingering measures, including forced-choice tests of symptom
validity. This is not to say that these criteria are without limitations. The limitations
include: not including an explicit definition o f malingering, not specifying rule-out
conditions or differential diagnoses, not including behavioral observations,
underspecified criteria, and being restricted to the evaluation o f feigned memory deficits
only without providing guidelines for the evaluation o f other neurocognitive domains.
Another set of criteria, which contrasts with the DSM-IV focus on motivation or
volition, has been developed by Pankratz. Pankratz argues, “Intentions, awareness,
conscious purposes, and psychodynamics should not be the main focus of the diagnostic
process (Pankratz & Erickson, 1990, p.386 as cited on p.547). According to these
criteria, it is not possible to accurately assess intent and volition, and thus, a diagnosis of
malingering should not be dependent upon judgments about an individual’s internal
states. Pankratz and Binder (1997) developed a list o f behaviors that are indicative of
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malingering. The behaviors are as follows: marked inconsistency between reported and
observed symptoms; marked inconsistency between diagnosis and neuropsychological
findings; resistance avoidance, or hizarre responses on standardized tests; failure on
specific measures o f faking; functional findings on medical examination; and late onset
of cognitive complaints following accident. Although Pankratz makes a compelling case
for these criteria, there are still some limitations. Unquestionably, inferences about
internal states and processes always have some level of uncertainty. However, the
diagnosis of malingering is far from alone in this regard; many other DSM-IV diagnoses
require a clinical judgment about an individual’s inner state. According to Slick,
Sherman, and Iverson (1999) “unless all cases of exaggeration or fabrication of deficits
constitute malingering, then the exclusion of any methods or guidelines for making a
determination about volition and intent is a significant limitation of purely behavioral
approaches to diagnosing malingering.
Pankratz is not the only researcher to consider behavioral manifestations of
malingering. Faust and Ackley (1998) also developed a list of behaviors that may be
indicative o f “intentional” inaccuracies in neuropsychological test data. These behaviors
include: poor effort on testing, exaggeration of symptoms, fabrication of symptoms, false
attributions (purposefully withholding or distorting history concerning other causes of
symptoms), presenting a false baseline (purposefully withholding or distorting
information about premorhid functioning), denial or failure to acknowledge strengths,
positive abilities, or positive areas of functioning. These authors go on to state that “two
basic dimensions, falsification and intentionality, are inherent or intrinsic components of
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malingering... [and]...to identify malingering, both dimensions will need to be assessed”
(p. 19 as cited in Slick et al., 1999, p.548).
As indicated by the research described above, there are a wide variety o f methods
and measures that are currently used to determine whether an individual is fabricating or
exaggerating symptoms during a neuropsychological evaluation. These methods and
measures include; inconsistencies or other signs from the individual’s reported
symptoms, inconsistencies or other signs from standard neuropsychological tests, and
measures or indices specifically designed to detect faking o f cognitive deficits. Slick et
al. (1999) have developed a new proposed set of criteria to assist in the diagnosis of
malingering. Several guidelines, based upon Nies and Sweet (1994), were used to guide
the development o f these criteria. The guidelines were the need for: a specific definition
of malingering of cognitive dysfimction within the context o f the neuropsychological
assessment; specific, unambiguous, and reliable criteria that cover all possible sources of
evidence (i.e., test-performance, observations, and collateral data); specification of the
relative importance o f diagnostic criteria; specification of the nature and role of clinical
judgment; specification o f differential diagnoses and exclusionary criteria; and
specification of levels of diagnostic certainty. Based upon these guidelines, the authors
developed a detailed set o f criteria to diagnose Possible, Probable, and Definite
Malingering of Neurocognitive Dysfimction. Slick et al. (1999) define Malingering o f
Neurocognitive Dysfunction as “.. .the volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive
dysfunction for the purpose of obtaining substantial material gain, or avoiding or
escaping formal duty or responsibility. Substantial material gain includes money, goods,
or services o f nontrivial value (e.g., financial compensation for personal injury. Formal
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duties are actions that people are legally obligated to perform (e.g., prison, military, or
public service, or child support payments or other financial obligations). Formal
responsibilities are those that involve accountability or liability in legal proceedings (e.g.,
competency to stand trial)” (p.552). These criteria were developed, and are widely
accepted and utilized, inductively from neuropsychological practice and reasoning. Thus,
there has been no study analyzing the reliability o f these criteria. They are cited in
multiple publications on the subject o f malingering, including Larrabee (2003a). The
three levels o f diagnostic certainty are described as follows:

Definite M alingering of Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“.. .indicated by the presence o f clear and compelling evidence o f volitional exaggeration
or fabrication o f cognitive dysfimction and the absence o f plausible alternative
explanations.” Specific criteria:

•
•
•

Presence o f a substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
Definite negative response bias [Criterion B l]
Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from group B are not frilly accounted for by
Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]

Probable M alingering o f Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“ ...indicated by the presence of evidence strongly suggesting volitional exaggeration or
fabrication o f cognitive dysfunction and the absence of plausible alternative
explanations.” Specific criteria:

•
•

Presence o f substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
Two or more types o f evidence from neuropsychological testing, excluding
definite negative response bias [two or more of Criteria B2-B6]

OR
• One type o f evidence from neuropsychological testing, excluding negative
response bias and one or more types of evidence from Self-Report [one of Criteria
B2-B6 and one or more of Criteria C 1-C5]
• Behaviors meeting neeessary eriteria from groups B and C are not fully accounted
for by Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]
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Possible M alingering o f Neurocognitive Dysfunction
“ ...indicated by the presence of evidence suggesting volitional exaggeration or
fabrication o f cognitive dysfunction and the absence of plausible alternative explanations.
Alternatively, possible MND is indicated by the presence o f criteria necessary for
Definite or Probably MND except that other primary etiologies cannot be ruled out.”
Specific criteria:

•
•
•

Presence o f substantial external incentive [Criterion A]
Evidence from self-report [one or more of Criteria C1-C5]
Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from group C are not fully accounted for by
Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors [Criterion D]

OR
• Criteria for Definite or Probable MND are met except for Criterion D (i.e.,
primary psychiatric, neurological, or developmental etiologies cannot be ruled
out). In these cases, the alternative etiologies that cannot be ruled out must be
specified.
Explanation o f Criteria

Criteria A: Presence o f a Substantial External Incentive
“At least one clearly identifiable and substantial external incentive for exaggeration or
fabrication o f symptoms is present at the time of examination (e.g., personal injury
settlement, disability pension, evasion of criminal prosecution, or release from military
service).”
Criteria B: Evidence from Neuropsychological Testing
“Evidence o f exaggeration or fabrication o f cognitive dysfunction on neuropsychological
tests as demonstrated by at least one of the following:
1. Definite Negative Response Bias. Below chance performance (p < .05) on one or
more forced-choice measures of cognitive function.
2. Probable Response Bias. Performance on one or more well-validated
psychometric tests or indices designed to measure exaggeration or fabrication of
cognitive deficits is consistent with feigning.
3. Discrepancy between Test Data and Known Patterns o f Brain Functioning. A
pattern o f neuropsychological test performance that is markedly discrepant from
currently accepted models of normal and abnormal central nervous system
function. The discrepancy must be consistent with an attempt to exaggerate or
fabricate neuropsychological dysfunction (e.g., a patient performs in the severely
impaired range on verbal attention measures but in the average range on memory
testing; a patient misses items on recognition testing that were consistently
provided on previous free recall trials, or misses many easy items when
significantly harder items from the same test are passed.
4. Discrepancy between Test Data and Observed Behavior. Performance on two or
more neuropsychological tests within a domain are discrepant with observed level
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of cognitive function in a way that suggests exaggeration or fabrication of
dysfunction (e.g., a well-educated patient who presents with no significant visualperceptual deficits or language disturbance in conversational speech performs in
the severely impaired range on verbal fluency and confrontation naming tests).
5. Discrepancy between Test Data and Reliable Collateral Reports. Performance on
two or more neuropsychological tests within a domain are discrepant with day-today level of cognitive function described by at least one reliable collateral
informant in a way that suggests exaggeration or fabrication of dysfunction (e.g.,
a patient handles all family finances but is unable to perform simple math
problems in testing).
6. Discrepancy between Test Data and Documented Background History.
Improbably poor performance on two or more standardized tests o f cognitive
function within a specific domain (e.g., memory) that is inconsistent with
documented neurological or psychiatric history (e.g., a patient with no
documented LOG or PTA, multiple negative neurological investigations, and no
other history o f CNS trauma or disease consistently obtains verbal memory scores
in the severely impaired range after a motor vehicle accident).”
Criteria C: Evidence from Self-Report
“The following behaviors are indicators o f possible malingering of cognitive deficits, but
their presence is not sufficient for the diagnosis. However, presence o f one or more of
these criteria provides additional evidence in support of a diagnosis of malingering.
These criteria involve significant inconsistencies or discrepancies in the patient’s selfreported symptoms that suggest a deliberate attempt to exaggerate or fabricate cognitive
deficits.
1. Self-reported History is Discrepant with Documented History. Reported history
is markedly discrepant with documented medical or psychosocial history and
suggests attempts to exaggerate injury severity or deny premorhid
neuropsychological dysfunction (e.g., exaggerated severity of physical injury or
length o f LOC/PTA; exaggerated premorhid educational or occupational
achievement; denial of previous head injury or previous psychiatric history).
2. Self-reported Symptoms are Discrepant with Known Patterns o f Brain
Functioning. Reported or endorsed symptoms are improbable in number,
patterns, or severity; or markedly inconsistent with expectations for the type or
severity o f documented injury or pathology (e.g., claims o f extended retrograde
amnesia without loss of memory for the accident, or claims of loss of
autobiographical information after mild head trauma without LOG).
3. Self-reported Symptoms are Discrepant with Behavioral Observations. Reported
symptoms are markedly inconsistent with observed behavior (e.g., a patient
complains o f severe episodic memory deficits yet has little difficulty
remembering names, events, or appointments; a patient complains of severe
cognitive deficits yet has little difficulty driving independently and arrives on
time for an appointment in an unfamiliar area; a patient complains of severely
slowed mentation and concentration problems yet easily follows complex
conversation).
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mf-rsDorted Symptoms are Discrepant with Information Obtainedfrom
Collateral Informants. Reported symptoms, history, or observed behavior is
inconsistent with information obtained from other informants judged to be
adequately reliable. The discrepancy must be consistent with an attempt to
exaggerate injury severity or deny premorhid neuropsychological dysfunction
(e.g., a patient reports severe memory impairment and/or behaves as if severely
memory-impaired, but their spouse reports that the patient has minimal memory
dysfunction at home.
5. Evidence o f Exaggerated or Fabricated Psychological Dysfunction. Self-reported
symptoms of psychological dysfunction are substantially contradicted by
behavioral observations and/or reliable collateral information. Well-validated
validity scales or indices on self-report measures of psychological adjustment
(e.g., MMPI-2) are strongly suggestive o f exaggerated or fabricated distress or
dysfunction.”
Criteria D: Behaviors Meeting Necessary Criteria from Groups B or C are Not Fully
Accountedfor by Psychiatric, Neurological, or Developmental Factors.
“Behaviors meeting necessary criteria from groups B and C are the product o f an
informed, rational, and volitional effort aimed at least in part towards acquiring or
achieving external incentives as described in Criteria A. As such, behaviors meeting
criterion from groups B or C cannot be fully accounted for by psychiatric, developmental,
or neurological disorders that result in significantly diminished capacity to appreciate
laws or mores against malingering, or inability to conform to behavior to such standards
(e.g., psychological need to “play the sick role”, or in resnonse to command
hallucinations.”
The article goes on to list some additional considerations that may play a role in the
diagnosis o f malingering. These include informed consent, such that in the process of
obtaining the informed consent the patient should be assisted in understanding that a
consistently high level o f effort is required and told that any evidence of poor or
inconsistent effort, or exaggeration or fabrication o f dysfunction will be noted in resulting
reports. Other items that should be considered are differential diagnoses, the concept of
“ruling out” malingering, the reliability, validity, and standardized administration o f the
diagnostic measures utilized, individual differences, prior patient behavior, clinical
judgment, and self-reported sjmiptoms.
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Finally, the Slick et al. (1999) point out contrasting points o f view, caveats,
recommendations, and conclusions. Throughout the years, the diagnosis of malingering
has certainly not gone unquestioned. Erickson has stated that “the diagnosis of
malingering is a weak diagnosis of exclusion that served to justify the denial of treatment
and benefits,” and that “were it not for some medicolegal expectations, we could do
without the diagnosis entirely” (Pankratz & Erickson, 1990, p. 381). Rogers (1990) goes
on to offer a counterpoint to the moralistic conceptualization o f the diagnosis of
malingering, an “adaptational m odel...in which the malingerer perceives an adversarial
context and chooses feigning on the basis of likelihood and expected utility” (p. 182).
These concerns are especially valid in cases where patients have comorhid malingered
deficits with actual deficits that may be treatable. However, these cases do not eliminate
the need for further clarification of the diagnostic criteria for malingering.
Slick et al. (1999) also consider the potential limitations of their diagnostic
criteria, one heing the role o f clinical judgment. The authors feel that well-trained
clinicians who utilize a variety of reliable and valid data to assist in their decision are
certainly capable o f making clinical judgments regarding volition and intent.
Furthermore, the guidelines set forth in this article do provide substantial guidance for
making these clinical inferences. These criteria were designed to “balance specificity
with flexibility, (p. 558). The authors do acknowledge that no two cases are identical, or
for that matter, even similar, and no one set o f diagnostic criteria can cover every
potential set o f data and circumstances. Thus, these criteria are meant to guide clinicians
in a flexible manner in making these diagnostic decisions. When diagnosing
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malingering, it is crucial that a clinician rule out the alternatives; these criteria are meant
to assist competent clinicians in this process.

Assessment of Malingering
After considering what malingering is, what disorders malingering must be
differentiated from, and the obstacles associated with detecting malingering, the question
arises, what measures and techniques can be utilized to accomplish this task? This
question is not easily answered as there are in fact many measures and techniques that
can be used. However, it then becomes a question of determining which measure or
technique most frequently is able to accurately diagnose malingering, or perhaps, more
specifically, which measure is most frequently able to accurately diagnose malingering in
personal injury litigation cases.
Some methods for assessing malingering utilize a variety of response options. One
alternative methodology is the use of the forced-choice technique. Examples of
assessments that utilize the forced-choice technique are the Test of Memory Malingering
(TOMM; Tombaugh, 2002) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2
(MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). Both of these
will be discussed in detail in subsequent segments of this review; however, these are
examples o f the forced-choice technique because they offer only two stimuli to a
participant (pictures on the TOMM and true or false questions on the MMPI-2) and force
the individual to make a choice between the two. According to Nies & Sweet (1994),
the detection o f malingering is not easy but it is possible with adequate effort. Gutierrez
& Gur (1998) offer guidelines for the development of malingering screens. These
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guidelines include a patient exhibiting near misses to simple questions (Pankratz, 1988),
gross discrepancies from expected norms (Larrabee, 1990), inconsistency between
diagnosis and neuropsychological findings, resistance, avoidance, bizarre responses,
inconsistencies between reported and observed symptoms, marked discrepancies between
measures that assess similar cognitive abilities, and failure on specific measures of
neuropsychological malingering. These guidelines helped lead to the development of
forced-choice techniques to assess malingering.
Forced-choice techniques were developed based upon the idea that misconceptions
about head injuries among the general public can be helpfiil to neuropsychologists as they
are the basis for symptom validity testing (Pankratz, 1988). Other researchers support
symptom validity testing in the detection of malingering as being simple yet effective
(Faust et al., 1991). Symptom validity testing is based on the binomial distribution
theory, which helps to establish clinical procedures that produce below-chance levels of
performance, which, in turn, can be indicative of malingering. For example, classic
studies done using a “blind” patient who was suspected of malingering found that
although this individual performed significantly below chance on assessments initially,
after he was told that the expectation o f a truly blind person was at least 50% correct (or
chance) his responses improved to within the chance level (Brady & Lind, 1961; Grosz &
Zimmerman, 1965).
The key feature o f forced-choice techniques is that they are constructed precisely for
the presenting complaint and to anticipate the responses of reluctant individuals. This
method proves to be very challenging for those who are trying to malinger because they
are either exposed as a fraud or it is found out that the deficit is not as serious as claimed.
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Essentially, this method exploits the lack of knowledge of the general public regarding
head injuries in order to determine exaggeration.
In what follows, multiple tests to diagnose malingering will be described in three
categories. First, neuropsychological test batteries that are characterized by the use of
multiple tests taken together, and that can be compared both on an intraindividual and an
interindividual level will be considered. Second, tests of memory impairment that
specifically assess for common misconceptions about the symptoms of head injury will
be reviewed. Lastly, a personality inventory, the MMPI-2, will be analyzed for its ability
to detect malingering.

Neuropsychological Test Batteries
Research on malingering has seldom utilized an entire test battery, but rather has
more frequently utilized the administration of a single test or examined a single set of
performances. Individual tests are typically interpreted in terms of how well they are
performed, with scores lower than expected usually thought to indicate malingering. This
method is difficult to apply with any degree of accuracy due to its simplicity. However,
test batteries produce scores that allow for comparison o f the individual’s performance
across a range o f tests. These scores can be compared to each other (intraindividual) and
with normative data (interindividual). If the test battery was specific and sensitive for
brain injury, one may be able to separate legitimate indications of brain damage from
feigned scores (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). The Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Test
Battery and the Halstead Reitan Neuropsychological Battery both fit into this category.
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Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery
A commonly used neuropsychological measure in the detection o f malingering is the
Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (LNNB; Golden & Grier, 1998). The
LNNB was originally designed when malingering was not factored into test development,
but it is still useful in the detection o f malingering. There are three forms of the LuriaNebraska Neuropsychological Battery. The first two are very similar, consisting of
twelve basic clinical scales plus scales designed for specific additional purposes. The
themes o f these scales include: motor, tactile, rhythm, visual, receptive, expressive,
reading, writing, arithmetic, memory, intelligence, intermediate memory, and
pathognomonic. The pathognomonic scale was designed to measure acuteness and
general functional seriousness of brain injuries. The scales are scored as 0 (normal), 1
(borderline), or 2 (abnormal), and are reported as T-scores with a mean o f 50 and a
standard deviation o f 10 (Golden & Grier, 1998). Higher scores are indicative of greater
dysfunction, and abnormal scores are determined by a critical level based upon age and
educational level. The critical level can vary from 50 to 70. The third, and most recent,
form of the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery is a substantially revised version
developed through the factor analysis of results from the original scales. The following
scales were added: nonverbal sound interpretation, visual-intellectual skills, speeded
repetition, reading comprehension, spelling, revised memory scales, and separate scales
for visual and verbal memory. An additional alteration to this form is that lower scores
are indicative o f greater dysfunction.
There are six major approaches to using the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological
Battery in the detection o f malingering (Golden & Grier, 1998). The first approach
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involves utilizing other tests specifically designed to detect malingering in addition to the
LNNB. Symptom Validity Testing (SVT; Bernard, 1990) described above is one such
addition. SVT consists of any multiple trial, forced choice activity designed to detect
feigned cognitive or sensory impairment. A typical example is any task that asks subjects
to recognize a previously presented stimulus fi’om among two stimuli (Guilmette, Hart, &
Giuliano, 1993). Performance below chance on such a measure is suggestive of
malingering. The Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT; Binder, 1993), a forced
choice recognition memory test, is a specific example of a symptom validity test. Binder
and Willis (1991) found that individuals with brain damage who were not seeking
financial compensation performed significantly better on the PDRT than mild head injury
patients who were seeking compensation. Poor performance on the PDRT has also been
found to be associated with a motivation to exaggerate impairment for financial gain
(Binder, 1993). Furthermore, Hiscock and Hiscock (1989) and Binder (1993) found that
patients seeking financial compensation performed worse on the PDRT items that seemed
more difficult than patients not seeking financial compensation. It appears that increased
perceived item difficulty may cause a person inclined to malinger to perform less well on
tasks that appear hard than on tasks that appear easy.
Other tests that support these conclusions, and can be used in conjunction with the
Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery, include the Hiscock Digit-Memory Test
(HDMT; Slick, Hopp, Strauss, Hunter, & Pinch, 1994; Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989) and the
Seashore Rhythm Test. The HDMT provides an alternative to more obvious measures of
motivation that are disguised as memory tests. Slick et al. (1994) found that all subjects
faking memory impairment performed significantly worse than brain injury patients.
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especially on items that seemed more difficult. The Seashore Rhythm Test provides
similar results. Gfeller, Cradock, and Falkenhain (1994) found that subjects faking
cognitive impairments performed significantly worse than those instructed to perform
optimally.
The second approach to using the LNNB to detect malingering involves the use of
specific formulas or LNNB scores. Mensch and Woods (1986) studied people with
average and above-average IQ’s who were offered a small reward for faking brain injury.
It was hypothesized that those with above-average IQ’s would be more capable of faking
than those with average IQ’s. The analyses included sex, IQ, and whether or not the
person was given instructions to fake symptoms; results indicated that only the
instructions to fake were significant. Additionally, only 16% of those instructed to fake
generated deficits on the Pathognomonic scale. Thus, it can be said that the
Pathognomonic scale is sensitive to malingering.
Other methods for using the LNNB to assess for malingering involve the test items
themselves. A forced-choice analysis o f the LNNB is possible because many items on
the measure are yes or no questions, which are essentially forced-choice. Therefore, the
same chance analysis that can be used on the Portland Digit Recognition Test and others
like it can be done on certain LNNB items (Golden & Grier, 1998). The internal
consistency of the LNNB items can also be important in using this measure to detect
malingering. The Luria Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery scales show high internal
consistency, but measure a specific domain (e.g. motor skills) by combining those skills
with a variety of other skills (Golden & Grier, 1998). Specific cross-scale item
correlations are indicative of the presence of a basic deficit. However, malingerers will
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not know that these relationships exist, so they will be likely to eonsistently show poor
performanee in one area but not on the other items that are on other seales that are highly
eorrelated with the poor performanee area. Consequently, this method serves as a very
good eheek on an individual’s overall profile.
Test-retest reliability and item eonsisteney o f the Luria Nebraska Neuropsyehologieal
Test Battery also serve a purpose when using this measure to deteet malingering. With
regard to test-retest reliability, the LNNB does not rely on novelty very mueh because it
tests more basic skills (Golden & Grier, 1998). It has higher than average test-retest
reliability and the test interval can be relatively short. Retest scores are expected to be
within 10 T-seore points o f the prior testing. Malingerers tend to have mueh greater
discrepancies, but the direction of the change is unpredictable. If an individual had two
or more seales differ by more than ten points on retest, it should arouse suspicion in the
clinician. Four or more seales that differ by more than ten points on retest vsdthout the
client’s condition changing would be indicative of malingering (Golden & Grier, 1998).
Item eonsisteney is similar to overall scale test-retest eonsisteney, but looks at the item
level. Across multiple test administrations, the level o f agreement across items in both
normal and brain-injured individuals whose conditions are stable is high. Golden, Berg,
and Graber (1982) and Plaisted & Golden (1982) found perfect item agreement in at least
90% of retest clients who were not malingering. Therefore, retest agreements of less than
90% at the item level could be evidence of malingering.
The final method for utilizing the Luria Nebraska Neuropsyehologieal Test Battery in
the assessment o f malingering is to examine the eonsisteney o f the test results with the
individual’s history and previous neuropsyehologieal test results (Golden & Grier, 1998).
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The relationship between neuropsychological findings and neurological and historical
findings is not exactly one to one, but a well-documented relationship exists.
Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery
The Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery is a widely used measure for
detecting traumatic brain injury. This measure can also be used to detect malingering and
invalid test results. Most o f the studies that have been conducted to develop a valid scale
to detect malingering have utilized normal participants who were instructed to pretend
that they had a brain injury while taking neuropsychological tests (Franzen, Iverson, &
McCracken, 1990). There are two major problems with this research. The first is the
assumption that normal subjects instructed to fake the types o f deficits that would result
from a head injury would actually be able to simulate the neuropsychological impairment
caused by brain damage (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). This is problematic because normal
subjects that pretend to have brain damage experience none of the stresses, anxieties,
depression, guilt, and desperation that are experienced by many litigants whose future
financial situation could depend on the outcome of neuropsychological testing. The other
problem with this approach is that the results are only able to obtain, at best, a certain
level o f statistical significance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). Current methods only give a
probability statement about the likelihood that intergroup differences are the result of
chance. The Halstead Reitan Neuropsychological Battery fits into this category o f test.
There are multiple ways that the HRNB can be employed in the detection of
malingering. The first is the use o f intraindividual test scores to identify invalid test
results. Psychologists usually depend on the level of performance when determining an
individual’s neuropsychological functioning (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998). Some
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psychiatrie and neurological conditions are thought to be associated with impaired
performance, but many individuals with such conditions perform within the normal
range. The fact that some test scores can fall into the normal range and some into the
impaired range for the same individual leads to a second approach to evaluating test
scores. To clarify, an individual with brain damage may perform poorly on tests that are
sensitive to brain damage and well on tests that are not sensitive to brain damage.
Therefore, a clinician should review a subject’s test scores and determine whether there
are inconsistencies in performance that exceed the limits of probability (Reitan &
Wolfson, 1998).
Invalid test results on the HRNB can also be identified by comparing two or more test
administrations. Most psyehometrie approaches to deteet malingering have evaluated test
scores based on a single examination or level of performance (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998).
Because malingerers are not the only ones who perform poorly on neuropsyehologieal
tests, this method is flawed. Additionally, malingerers may earn relatively good scores
on a test even though they are not giving their best effort and are performing below their
optimal level. Comparing an individual’s scores on the same test administered on two
different occasions may be a better approach to detecting malingering (Reitan &
Wolfson, 1998). This method uses the subject as his or her own control, and avoids the
implicit problems o f interindividual evaluations. Inconsistencies that are commonly
observed by using this method indicate that those who are not putting forth their best
possible effort respond less eonsistently than those who are not influenced by
circumstantial factors such as litigation (Reitan & Wolfson, 1998).
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Memory Impairment
The main reason for developing memory impairment malingering tests was the need
for a specific test to detect the faking o f memory impairment, and the fact that during the
mid-1990’s there was a failure of methods available to meet this need. Additionally,
there was much debate in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s as to whether or not
neuropsychologists were able to detect malingering based on neuropsychological test
scores (Arkes, Faust, & Guilmette, 1990; Barth, Ryan, & Hawk, 1992; Bigler, 1990).
This debate was not conclusive, but most involved thought that detecting malingering
based only upon neuropsychological test scores was highly problematic. This is likely
because inconsistency is the hallmark of malingering in that it can range from grossly
exaggerated differences in scores between faked and legitimate symptoms to a pattern of
scores that simply does not make “neurological sense”. Thus, it is impractical to try to
use these inconsistencies to identify malingering.
Tombaugh (2002) identified several qualitative signs of malingering on tests of
cognitive ability. These qualitative signs include memory impairment that is
disproportionate with the severity of the injury, discrepancies between scores on tests
measuring similar abilities, inconsistencies between memory complaints and observed
behavior, failing easy items on a test while passing more difficult ones, increased
frequency o f “I don’t know” answers, increased frequency of near misses or approximate
answers, pronounced decline in performance on delayed recognition tests, scores on
recognition tests are relatively lower than scores on recall tests, and the profile of test
scores not making “neurological sense”. Tombaugh (2002) went on to utilize these
qualitative signs to develop criteria for developing a test designed to detect memory
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malingering. His criteria stated that the test should be sensitive to the faking of memory
deficits, but should not be sensitive to any other factors that typically produce a memory
deficit. Therefore, this test should be insensitive to the effects of demographic variables,
traumatic brain injury, neuropsychological disorders, and affective disorders. Tombaugh
(2002) also stated that these tests should have greater perceived difficulty than actual
difficulty, high face validity as a test of memory, and universal application.
Test of Memory Malingering
The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) is yet another measure that can be used in
the detection of malingering (Tombaugh, 2002). The TOMM was developed to provide
an objective, criterion-based psychometric test that can differentiate between people with
actual memory impairment and those who are faking the symptoms of memory
impairment. Thé qualitative signs and criteria described above led to the development of
the Test o f Memory Malingering.
The TOMM consists of two learning trials and a retention trial (Tombaugh, 2002). It
has been validated with both a clinical and non-elinieal sample. A clinical sample was
used to determine if performance on the TOMM was affected by various types of
neurological impairment, and to provide a set of clinically based norms that would allow
for direct comparison between TOMM scores obtained fi-om a person suspected of
malingering and TOMM scores obtained fi'om a person with similar levels of
neurological damage/injury but not suspected o f malingering (Tombaugh, 2002).
Essentially, the clinically based norms provide a baseline where the performance of
suspected malingerers could be compared to the performance o f non-malingerers. The
TOMM also has empirically based criterion scores. A person can get 50% correct on the
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TOMM just by guessing. The range for chance performance is 18 to 32 (Tombaugh,
2002). Scores below 18 are unlikely to occur by chance, which implies that the person
knew what the correct answer was but intentionally chose the incorrect answer.
Word Memory Test
The Word Memory Test (WMT) can also be used to determine whether or not an
individual is feigning symptoms or is not performing optimally on neuropsychological
tests (Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). The WMT is made up of measures that are
very sensitive to exaggeration or poor effort, but are very sensitive to all but the most
extreme forms o f cognitive impairment. This test, which has been extensively validated
in clinical forensic settings, measures verbal learning and memory, and has been designed
to allow for evaluation o f a person’s effort to do well. Thus, it can determine whether or
not test scores are valid estimates o f an individual’s ability. The Word Memory Test
assesses a person’s ability to leam a list of 20 word pairs presented either orally or on a
computer screen across multiple subtests. These subtests include Immediate Recall,
Delayed Recognition, Multiple Choice, Paired Associates, Delayed Free Recall, and
Long Delayed Free Recall; each subtest varies widely in its objective difficulty level
(Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). It is very difficult for a person who is not making a
full effort to produce a valid profile on the WMT. Patients with moderate to severe brain
injuries can obtain scores o f about 95% (above 38 out of 40 correct) on the Immediate
Recall and Delayed Recognition trials while healthy controls had mean scores above 97%
(Green, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2002). This indicates that these WMT scales are unrelated
to major measures of head injury severity. Further support for this statement is found
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when one considers that those with mild head injuries score, on average, significantly
lower on the WMT with regard to effort than people with the most severe brain injuries.

Differentiating Between Head Injury, Somatization Disorder,
& Malingering
Although all of the tests outlined above are able to detect malingering of traumatic
brain injury to some degree, none o f these measures is designed to differentiate between
traumatic brain injury and a somatization disorder. Since it can be difficult to determine
whether or not someone is malingering or suffering from a somatization disorder as
reviewed above, these two possibilities need to be differentiated when conducting a
neuropsychological assessment. Thus, there is a need for an additional means of
detecting malingering that can effectively differentiate brain injury and somatization
disorder. It is also critical that measures that are utilized to detect malingering not be too
heavily skewed toward somatic complaints, which can result in individuals with
somatization disorders being diagnosed as malingerers. A balance between detecting
malingering and detecting somatization disorder must be achieved in order for proper
diagnosis and treatment to occur. One measure that takes into account the possibility of
somatization disorder in the detection of malingering is the forced-choice Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2 (MMPI-2). However, the empirical question
remains, does this measure rely too heavily on somatic complaints to accurately
differentiate between malingerers and those with a somatization disorder? It is to this and
other considerations o f the MMPI-2 that we turn next.
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Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2
Like the above neuropsychological and memory impairment methods, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen,
& Kaemmer, 1989) can be used to detect the feigning of head injury symptoms (Berry &
Butcher, 1998). The MMPI-2 is the most commonly used test of personality and
psychopathology in general forensic evaluations and forensic neuropsychological
evaluations (Lees-Haley, 1992; Lees-Haley, Smith, Williams, & Duim, 1995). It consists
o f ten clinical scales, which include Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria,
Psychopathic Deviate, Masculinity-Femininity, Paranoia, Psychasthenia, Schizophrenia,
Hypomania, and Social Introversion. This measure also has well-developed validity
scales for assessing the possibility of response sets in answering test questions (Pope,
Butcher, & Seelen, 1993) as well as seven standard scales for the assessment of possible
invalid approaches to the test.
Psychopathology that can occur following a head injury that relates to the clinical
scales o f the MMPI-2 include the following: irritability, agitation, belligerence, anger,
violence, impulsiveness, impatience, restlessness, social inappropriateness, lability,
anxiety, sensitivity to noise, suspiciousness, delusions, paranoia, mania, spontaneity,
sluggishness, loss o f interest, loss of drive, fatigue, and depression. Gass and Ansley
(1995) provide an overview of personality assessment of neurologically impaired
patients, with findings that indicate a tendency toward elevations o f scales 1, 2, 3, 7, and
8, or Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria, Psychasthenia, and Schizophrenia,
respectively. However, other evidence demonstrates that there is likely no consistent
“head injury” profile on the MMPI-2. For example, Alfano et al (1992) found that a wide
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variety o f two-point eodes, eneompassing virtually all elinieal scales, have been found for
head injury patients, and Bomstein et al. (1988) reported that signifieant elevations ean
oeeur on virtually any elinieal scale for various subgroups of head injury patients.
The MMPI-2 must also be considered in light of neurological content, such that
accurate responses by neurologieal patients might make their MMPI-2 profile appear
more psyehopathologieal than is aetually the ease. Seales 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 have the
highest number o f neurologically related items, but deleting these items would likely
underestimate psychopathology (Gass & Russell, 1991). Additionally, eorreetion for
neurologieal eontent may obseure possible psychological issues in a patient group where
sueh faetors could be making an important eontribution to the overall picture.
The possibility o f response sets on the MMPI-2 is also important when assessing for
malingering. Response sets are present when a test-taker produees answers that are not
meaningfully related to questions or are distorted in some important way. Two major
categories o f response sets exist (Nichols, Greene, & Schmolek, 1989). Content
nonresponsiveness (CNR) is present when answers bear no meaningful relationship to
questions (e.g., omitted, double-marked, or random responses). Content responsive
faking (CRT) oeeurs when a test-taker distorts responses based on the eontent of the
questions (e.g., under- or overreporting of psychopathology).
There is signifieant empirieal literature on the faking of head injury symptoms on the
MMPI and MMPI-2 (e.g., Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greififenstein et al.,
2004; Lairabee, 1998; Berry & Butcher, 1998). Basically, MMPI measures contain a
number of scales that are sensitive to the overreporting of psyehological symptoms. The
F scale is considered to be the best, followed by the F-K, Ds/Ds2, and F(b) seales (Ben-
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Porath, Graham, Hall, Hirschman, & Zaragoza, 1995). There is some support for the
newer F(p) and FBS scales as well (Berry & Butcher, 1998). Analog studies suggest that
those who are faking and/or potentially exaggerating the symptoms of head injury tend to
show elevated MMPI-2 overreporting symptom scales (Berry & Butcher, 1998). For
example, F scale t-scores in the 80’s would raise concern about overreporting; t-scores in
the 90’s and above indicate the need for special attention to the possibility of
overreported symptoms. Interestingly, studies of mild head injury patients with strong
evidence o f malingering cognitive deficits indicate that only a subset also overreports
psychological symptoms; thus, the faking o f cognitive deficits and psychological
symptoms may be independent in those malingering head injury (Berry & Butcher,
1998).
The F scale, which was originally on the MMPI, consists o f 64 items selected because
of low endorsement rates among the normative sample (Berry & Butcher, 1998). This
scale has remained mostly the same on the MMPI-2. These items were selected to
represent a wide variety o f problems and content areas so that those reporting actual
psychological distress would be unlikely to endorse more than a few of these items
(Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972). Most of the MMPI-2 validity scales, like the F
scale, are sensitive to content nonresponsiveness and to random reporting.
Another index on the MMPI-2 that is used for detecting response sets is the F-K
index. Rogers, Sewell, and Salekin (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of 15 studies
investigating the detection of malingering on the MMPI-2 and found continued support
for the F and F-K scales. Support was also found for the F(b) scale. These results
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indicate that there is support for the use of the traditional seales, F and F-K, as well as
promising support for the F(b) scale in the detection o f malingering.
Since the MMPI-2 is the most widely utilized symptom report scale in forensic
neuropsychology, there is utility in further examining the ability o f its specific seales at
detecting malingering. One of these seales is the Fake Bad Seale (FBS; Lee-Haley,
English, & Glenn, 1991). As this is a newer scale on the MMPI-2, there is preliminary
evidence, sueh as that described above, that this scale shows promising ability in the
assessment o f malingering. However, there is still mueh research to be done in
determining the strengths and weaknesses of the Fake Bad Seale.
The Fake Bad Seale of the MMPI-2
Although the Fake Bad Scale was originally designed to deteet malingering in
personal injury cases, it appears to be better at indicating invalid response styles in
somatic injury eases, including brain injury cases, without assuming we know why an
individual is exaggerating (Lees-Haley, 1997). For example, Larrabee (1997) suggested
that “somatic malingering should be considered whenever elevations on seales 1 and 3
[on the MMPI-2] exceed T=80, accompanied by a significant elevation on the FBS (p.
203).” The Fake Bad Scale consists of 43 items, which were selected on the basis of their
content (Lees-Haley et al., 1991). This scale was constructed utilizing rational as well as
empirical strategies, similarly to the way the MMPI-2 itself was constructed
(Greiffenstein et al., 2002). The original validation sample consisted o f individuals who
were suspected o f malingering, individuals who were instructed to feign symptoms, and
individuals believed to be suffering from actual head injuries. In this study, Lees-Haley
(1991) suggested a cutoff score of 20 to be indicative of malingering, and obtained
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accurate classification of malingerers 96% of the time, for true patients 93% of the time,
and for those instructed to feign symptoms 74% of the time. It was also found that
malingerers and those instructed to fake usually answered the true-false items on the FBS
in the opposite manner than those with actual head injuries, normal controls, and
psychiatric controls. A later study done by Lees-Haley (1992) found that the
FBS is also useful for detecting those who are malingering posttraumatic stress disorder,
although it is necessary to utilize higher cutoff scores for this population. In fact, the
cutoff scores found in this study of 24 for males and 26 for females are now widely
accepted as the cutoff scores for malingering across populations (Larrabee, 1998).
As stated previously, the Fake Bad Scale was constructed in much the same way that
the overall MMPI-2 was constructed. The development of this scale was based upon
malingerer response patterns that include a tendency toward: “(1) appearing honest; (2)
appearing psychologically normal except for the influence o f the alleged cause of injury;
(3) avoiding admitting preexisting psychopathology; (4) attempting to minimize the
impact of previously disclosed preexisting complaints; (5) minimizing or hiding preinjury
antisocial or illegal behavior; and (6) presenting a degree of injury or disability within the
perceived limits o f plausibility (Larrabee, 2003b, p. 55).”
The scoring o f the Fake Bad Scale ranges fi'om 0 to 43, with 18 items scored in the
“True” direction and 25 items scored in the “False” direction (Larrabee, 2003b). The
majority of the items on this scale are fiom the Hypochondriasis and Hysteria clinical
scales. Additionally, there are six items fiom the Schizophrenia clinical scale, four items
each from the F scale, the Depression clinical scale, and the Paranoia clinical scale, three
items each fiom the Psychasthenia and Social Introversion clinical scales, two items fiom
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the Psychopathie Deviate clinical scale, and one item each from the L and K seales
(Larrabee, 2003b).
Martens, Donders, and Millis (2001) and Miller and Donders (2001) have also
examined the accuracy o f the Fake Bad Scale; however, this research was done in the
context of determining the base rate of invalid response sets. According to Miller and
Donders (2001), Fake Bad Scale scores were elevated in 4% o f individuals with moderate
to severe traumatic head injury, in 30% of those with mild traumatic head injuries
without financial incentives, and in 50% of those with mild traumatic head injury who
were either involved in personal injury litigation or had filed for permanent complete
disability. Furthermore, Miller and Donders (2001) state “This subscale [FBS] consists
of MMPI-2 items that were selected for content on the basis of frequent counts of
endorsements in personal injury claimants. The FBS has demonstrated potential
sensitivity to exaggerated cognitive, emotional, or somatic distress in several recent
investigations with individuals in personal litigation...” (p.298). Martens and colleagues
(2001) found similar evidence when using the FBS criteria in a clinical sample, with 22%
o f these individuals having invalid response sets. Both o f these data are consistent with
previously reported base rates of invalid response sets.
There have been numerous studies that compare the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2
to other validity seales o f this measure. Dearth et al. (2004) addressed this issue by
comparing individuals with moderate to severe head injuries to community volunteers
who were either instructed to fake symptoms or to answer honestly during an analog
forensic neuropsyehologieal evaluation. The intent was to determine the possible
eontribution o f the MMPI-2 validity seales to identifying malingerers during
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neuropsychological evaluations. Most of the validity seales were found to have perfect
speeifieity rates, but low to moderate sensitivity. The Fake Bad Seale, however, had both
moderate speeifieity and moderate sensitivity. While these authors did find the Fake Bad
Scale to be superior over other seales at the detection of malingering in
neuropsyehologieal examination, this superiority was not as dramatic as in other studies.
A potential explanation for this finding is the study design, which involved simulated
malingering in an analog forensic neuropsyehologieal evaluation rather than actual
suspected malingerers in actual neuropsyehologieal testing situations.
Fox, Gerson, and Lees-Haley (1995) also examined the various validity scales of the
MMPI-2 in order to determine how well they fare in personal injury cases; in particular
the purpose was to determine how sensitive the validity seales are in these cases. The
authors found that the Fake Bad Seale may be sensitive to various aspects of malingering
that are not measured by traditional MMPI-2 validity seales. Furthermore, the FBS may
not measure malingering as it is traditionally defined by the DSM-IV, which only
involves faking bad. It appears, based upon this study, that in personal injury eases
malingering may involve a mixture of both faking bad and faking good. Thus, the
authors make the argument that the Fake Bad Seale is particularly useful in the detection
o f malingering in personal injury claims, which is the original intent of the scale.
Greiffenstein et al. (2002) concur with these findings by defining the purpose of the Fake
Bad Seale as being to “deteet the simulation o f emotional distress in the context of
compensation seeking (p. 1591)” and by finding the Fake Bad Seale to be superior to
traditional MMPI-2 seales in the detection o f malingering.
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Larrabee (2003a) examined the overall MMPI-2 profiles of individuals vyho vyere
identified as meeting criteria for definite malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction in
comparison to the MMPI-2 profiles of individuals who suffered from either moderate or
severe closed head injury. His findings indicated that the Fake Bad Seale was the most
sensitive scale in differentiating those who were malingering from those who had
suffered a head injury. Additionally, signifieant differences were found between these
two groups on the Hypochondriasis, Depression, Hysteria, Psychasthenia, and
Schizophrenia seales of the MMPI-2.
Tsushima and Tsushima (2001) also found support for the Fake Bad Seale in
comparison to other MMPI-2 validity seales in terms of its discriminatory power. The
authors found that the FB A had significantly better discriminatory power with regard to
differentiating between personal injury litigants, elinieal patients, and normal controls
than the other MMPI-2 validity seales. More speeifieally, it was determined that the
litigants and elinieal patients had higher Fake Bad Seale scores than the normal controls.
Additionally, the FBS may be able to deteet somatic overreporting more accurately
because it is sensitive to symptom exaggeration.
In comparison to the F scale, the Fake Bad Scale has been found in at least one study
done by Larrabee (1998) to be superior at detecting malingering of head injuries. This
study found that only 3 out of 12 litigating participants who were also suspected of
malingering had elevations on the F scale while II of 12 of these individuals had
elevations o f the Fake Bad Seale. However, Larrabee (1998) utilized the higher cutoff
scores o f 24 for males and 26 for females based upon the earlier suggestion of these
cutoffs by Lees-Haley (1992) for the detection of malingered PTSD. The use of these
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higher eutoff scores was a response to the fact that there is considerable overlap between
the Fake Bad Scale, the Hypochondriasis scale, and the Hysteria scale o f the MMPI-2.
Larrabee (2003b) also examined the accuracy of the Fake Bad Scale in comparison to
other standard neuropsyehologieal tests in terms of detecting malingering. He identified
cut-off scores that defined clinically atypical patterns of performance on five standard
neuropsychological tests, including the Benton Visual Form Discrimination Test,
Fingertapping, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised Reliable Digit Span, the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Failure-to-Maintain Set, and the Lees-Haley Fake Bad Seale
from the MMPI-2. All possible pair-wise combinations of scores beyond the eut-off
scores were considered. These pair-wise combinations correctly identified 87.5% of
those meeting criteria for definite malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction and 88.9% of
those with moderate to severe closed head injury. Furthermore, on cross-validation
88.2% o f those meeting criteria for probably malingered neuroeognitive dysfunction were
correctly identified, with 13 of 13 non-litigating neurologic patients and 14 of 14 non
litigating psychiatric patients correctly identified as having motivationally-preserved
performance. Taken together, the samples result in a sensitivity of 87.8%, a specificity of
94.4%, and a combined ‘hit-rate’ of 91.6%. Slick, Hopp, Strauss, and Spellacy (1996)
also compared the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2 to other neuropsychological tests and
other MMPI-2 validity seales. These authors found that the FBS correlates with other
tests o f malingering, sueh as the Portland Digit Recognition Test and the Victoria
Symptom Validity Test. Specifically, it was indicated that the FBS correlated higher
with the Victoria Symptom Validity Test than did other MMPI-2 scales, including the F,
F-K, F(p), and 0-S indices.
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Ross, Millis, Kmkowski, Putnam, and Adams (2004) also found support for the use
o f the Fake Bad Scale to detect malingering of head injuries. These investigators utilized
a cutoff score of 21 and successfully identified 90% of litigating mild head injury cases
and 90% of actual head injury patients. Ross et al. (2004) also examined the overlap of
the Fake Bad Scale and the Hysteria and Hypochondriasis Scales. They found that
although the Fake Bad, the Hysteria, and the Hypochondriasis Scales were related, the
FBS carried the majority o f the variance in detecting malingering. Thus, “these results
suggest that the FBS, and the construct that it represents, are more indicative of invalid
responding rather than somatoform disorder (Ross et al., 2004, p. 122).”
Taken together these data indicate that the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 is
potentially effective at detecting somatic malingering. However, there is little evidence
that the Fake Bad Scale is successful at differentiating between an actual head injury, a
somatization disorder, and malingering. Several studies stated that the Fake Bad Scale is
weighted heavily in the direction of somatic complaints leaving it open to the criticism
that it may not be an accurate tool for making the differentiation between these
possibilities. Thus, further research must be done in this area in order to determine the
ability o f the FBS to make these differentiations, particularly among personal injury
litigants.

Present Research
The present study will expand upon previous research regarding the efficacy of the
Fake Bad Scale for detecting the malingering o f head injuries. In particular, this study
will focus on a similar question to that addressed by Ross et al. (2004) regarding the
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efficacy o f the FBS in differentiating malingering and somatization disorders.
Specifically, the research aims to use established comprehensive medical and
neuropsyehologieal records to differentiate between individuals who aetually have
sustained a head injury from those who have been determined to have a somatoform
disorder or individuals who have been determined to be malingering as indicated by these
comprehensive medical and neuropsyehologieal records. In so doing, special attention
will be given to the items contributing to the FBS for those diagnosed as having a
somatization disorder.
The research is guided by the following hypotheses:
1. That the FBS will successfully differentiate between individuals who have a
traumatic brain injury and individuals who are malingering as well as between
individuals who have a traumatic brain injury and those with a somatoform
disorder, but will less successfully differentiate between individuals who have a
somatoform disorder and those who are malingering.
2. The FBS will be comparable to other MMPI-2 validity scales and to the Portland
Digit Recognition Test and the Test of Memory Malingering in its ability to
differentiate between individuals who have a traumatic brain injury and those who
are malingering as well as between those with a traumatic brain injury and
individuals with a somatoform disorder, but will be less successful than these
other measures at differentiating between individuals with a somatoform disorder
and those who are malingering.
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3. That there will not he gender differences in the Fake Bad Scale’s ahility to
differentiate between individuals with traumatic hrain injuiy, individuals with a
somatoform disorder, and individuals who are malingering.
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CHAPTER 3

METHOD
Participant Data Set
The participant sample consisted of the neuropsychological records o f 283 individuals
who were involved in either a personal injury or workman’s compensation lawsuit who
were diagnosed by a licensed psychologist in a private neuropsychology practice. Each
participant had been administered a combination o f the following psychological and
neuropsychological assessments as was deemed appropriate by their presenting
complaint: Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-Ill, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory-2, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised, Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale-Ill, Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill, Wide Range Achievement Test-3, Grip Strength,
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Reitan Klove Sensory Perceptual
Examination, Tactile Finger Recognition, Tactile Form Recognition, Fingertip Number
Writing, Tactual Performance Test, Trails A and B, Short Category Test, Boston Naming
Test, Stroop Color Word Test, Letter and Category Fluency tests. Test of Memory
Malingering, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Portland Digit Recognition, Adult DSM-IV
Symptom Checklist, Significant Life Events Questioimaire, California Verbal Learning
Test, and Lateral Dominance Examination.
Each participant had also undergone an extensive clinical interview, the notes from
which were contained in their records. Additionally, complete medical records were also
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available for these participants and were reviewed by the investigator for those individual
participants with presenting eomplaints that warranted such a review.
The diagnoses represented in this participant sample included the following: Major
Depressive Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Panic Disorder, Substance
Dependenee, Pain Disorder, Avoidant Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality
Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Conversion Disorder, Hypochondriasis,
Schizoid Personality Disorder, Histrionic Personality Disorder, Adjustment Disorders
with Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Mood, Undifferentiated Somatoform Disorder,
Dementia due to Closed Head Injury, Personality Change due to Closed Head Injury,
Dysthymie Disorder, Traumatic Brain Injury, and Malingering. The diagnosis of
malingering was made utilizing the Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999) criteria
previously described. For the purposes of this research, only individuals who received a
diagnosis of definite malingering were included in the sample.
O f the 283 participant records in this sample, 30 had a diagnosis of definite
malingering, 31 had a diagnosis o f a pure somatoform disorder, and 21 had a diagnosis of
a traumatic brain injury for a total of 82 participant records whose diagnoses were
pertinent to the present research. A power analysis conducted utilizing F-power from
SAS indicated that, for a moderate effect size of .75 utilizing a one-way ANOVA, a
sample of 30 partieipants in each of the three groups of interest would provide a power of
.726.
The remaining 201 participants in the overall record sample had either a diagnosis
that was not pertinent to this study or had multiple “rule out” diagnoses that may have
included the three of interest in this study. Individuals who did not have a pure diagnosis
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of malingering, a somatoform diagnosis, or traumatic brain injury were not considered in
the final analyses. There were 12 additional individuals who were diagnosed with
traumatic brain injury who were not actually tested in the private practice where the data
were collected; these individuals’ medieal and psychological records were simply
submitted for a record review. None of these cases was considered in the final participant
sample o f 82 participants. Lastly, there were 7 records from the overall participant
sample that fit the diagnostic criteria for this study but were missing pertinent
information (e.g., MMPI-2 answers were missing preventing a Fake Bad Scale score
from being calculated). These records were also not considered in the final participant
sample.
Of the 82 participants whose reeords were considered further in the research, 38 were
female and 44 were male. The age range for the research sample was 18 to 71 years of
age, with a mean age o f 42.48 and a standard deviation of 10.56. The ethnic breakdown
of the sample was as follows: 8 African American (9.75%), 2 Asian/Pacific Islander
(2.43%), 62 Caucasian (75.60%), 7 Hispanic (8.53%), and 3 Other (3.65%). The ethnic
breakdown was determined by patient self-report. The category of Other included
individuals who identified themselves by specific country of origin; one individual in that
group self-identified as Lebanese, another self-identified as Iranian, and the third self
identified as Hungarian.

Procedure
The study evaluated and eompared the Fake Bad Scale scores of the MMPI-2 for the
research sample o f 82 individuals in order to determine whether the Fake Bad Scale
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accurately differentiated among traumatic brain injuiy ( N= 21), somatoform disorder (
N=31), and malingering patients (N=30). It was of particular interest to examine the
Fake Bad Scale Scores of those individuals diagnosed with a somatoform disorder since
prior research indicated that the Fake Bad Scale may be heavily weighted toward somatic
complaints.
This study further compared the Fake Bad Scale to measures of infrequent responding
on the MMPI-2, as well as to the Portland Digit Recognition Test (Binder, 1993), and the
Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 2002). The power of the Fake Bad Scale to
differentiate among traumatic brain injuiy, somatoform disorder and malingering was
also examined with regard to gender differences.
Each of the 82 individual reeords were examined by the researcher and summarized
in a written report that included demographic information, background information
regarding the participant’s circumstances, including medical evidence,
neuropsychological and psychological test results, and diagnosis. Redacted examples of
these reports can be found in Appendix A. Any data that were not already numeric was
coded by the researcher for purposes of further statistical analyses.
The coding system for gender was I for male and 2 for female. The coding system
for ethnicity was I for African American, 2 for Asian/Pacific Islander, 3 for Caucasian, 4
for Hispanic, and 5 for Other. Medical evidence was coded as 0 if there was little to no
medical evidence to support a claim of injuiy by the participant; this included negative
neuroimaging (e.g., no positive CT Scans, no positive MRIs) and a normal Glasgow
Coma Scale Score. Medical evidence was coded as I if there was substantial medical
evidence to support a participant’s injuiy claim; this included positive neuroimaging
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(e.g., one or more positive CT Scans, one or more positive MRIs) and an impaired
Glasgow Coma Scale Seore.
The coding o f medical evidence, as well as the inelusion of only those individuals
with a diagnosis o f definite malingering or a pure somatoform disorder, were utilized as a
means of establishing a level o f inter-rater reliability. There were no discrepancies
between the present investigator’s coding of medical evidence and that of the elinieian
who initially assigned the diagnoses to the partieipants. Similarly, a Glasgow Coma
Seale Seore o f 12 or lower (Bigler & Clement, 1997) was considered to be impaired by
the present investigator. Again, based upon this there were no discrepancies between the
present investigator and the elinieian who initially assigned the diagnoses to the
partieipants.
Lastly, in terms of coding, scores on the Portland Digit Recognition Test were coded
as 1 or 0. A code o f 1 indicated that the participant fell below the eut-off seore for
malingering, which indicated suboptimal effort. A code of 0 indicated that the participant
fell above the eut-off seore for malingering, which indicated that the participant put forth
optimal effort on that particular measure. This latter coding was necessitated because
some partieipants were given an abbreviated version o f the Portland Digit Recognition
Test while others were given the full version, resulting in different cut-off scores. The
eut-off seore for malingering for the 27-item version o f the Portland Digit Recognition
Test is 15 and the cut-off seore for malingering for the 72-item version of the Portland
Digit Recognition Test is 39.
Each of the previously articulated hypotheses was considered using the data
extracted from the records and analyzed statistically using SPSS. A consideration of the
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approaches used to address these hypotheses is given next. The FBS was primarily
examined in order to determine how well it differentiated among participants with a
traumatic brain injury, with a somatoform or other psychological disorder, and
participants who were malingering. It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would
successfully differentiate between participants with traumatic brain injuries and those
who were malingering and between participants with traumatic brain injury and those
who had a somatoform disorder, but that the FBS would be less successful in
differentiating between participants who were malingering and those who had a
somatoform disorder. In order to address these hypotheses, the sensitivity and specificity
of the Fake Bad Scale were evaluated. Sensitivity indicated the proportion of confirmed
malingering participants, or those who were above the established cut-off scores for
malingering, that were correctly identified by the Fake Bad Scale. Specificity indicated
the proportion of non-malingering participants, or those who were below the established
cut-off scores for malingering, that were correctly identified by the Fake Bad Scale. A
one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the differences among these three groups.
A Bonferroni Comparison was made post hoc.
Next, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was compared to the F scale, the F-K
index, and the F(b) scales of the MMPI as well as to the Test o f Memory Malingering and
the Portland Digit Recognition Test in order to determine how well each of these scales
differentiated among those with traumatic brain injuries, those with somatoform
disorders, and those who were malingering. The relevant hypothesis here was that the
Fake Bad Scale would be comparable to other MMPI-2 validity scales, and to the other
measures o f malingering used, when differentiating between TBI and malingering as well
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as between TBI and somatoform disorders. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that
the FBS would be less successfiil than the other MMPI-2 validity scales, and the other
measures o f malingering used, at differentiating between somatoform disorders and
malingering. These hypotheses were statistically analyzed using a one-way ANOVA and
posthoc Bonferroni comparisons. Additionally, correlations between the obtained Fake
Bad Scale, the F scale, the F-K index, and the F(b) scale score were examined, as was the
percentage o f item overlap that occurred between each validity scale, in order to address
the issue of colinearity. Statistical comparisons were not conducted for the Test of
Memory Malingering or for the Portland Digit Recognition Test due to the unexpectedly
small numbers of participants who were administered these measures.
The final research question considered was whether there were gender differences
with respect to how well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 differentiated among those
participants who had a traumatic brain injury, a somatoform disorder, or were
malingering. This was evaluated statistically utilizing a one-way ANOVA. Significant
differences were not hypothesized to occur due to the fact that the Fake Bad Scale utilizes
gender specific cut-off scores of 24 for men and 26 for women.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS
Prior to beginning the statistical analyses of the MMPI-2 validity scales, the
scales were examined to determine the degree to which the items of each scale
overlapped with the items o f each other scale that was used in this research. This was
done since if there were considerable overlap in items on the validity scales, one would
necessarily expect that the individual scales would not show differences in the differential
diagnosis of malingering simply due to item duplication on each scale.
The K Scale was considered, rather than the F-K Index, in analyzing item overlap
because the F-K Index is a score that is obtained by subtracting the obtained raw score on
the K Scale from the obtained raw score on the F Scale. Thus, there are no specific items
on the F-K Index; it is the difference o f the scores obtained on two separate scales.
Table 1 presents the percentage o f item overlap that occurs between each of the
MMPI-2 validity scales, that is the percentage of items that appeared on multiple scales.
As can be seen, there is minimal item overlap between the MMPI-2 validity scales that
were considered in this study. All o f the scales have fewer than six per cent shared items.
The greatest item overlap occurs between the Fake Bad Scale and the F and K scales,
which themselves have an item overlap of slightly more than one per cent. The F(b) scale
has zero item overlap with the F and K scales. Since the validity scales o f the MMPI-2

70

generally have so few items in common with each other, the issue of collinearity among
the scales compared herein was not considered as a factor of importance in this research.

Table 1: Percent tem Overlap Between MMPI-2 Validity Scales
F Scale
K Scale
Fake Bad Scale
100%
Fake Bad Scale
4.85%
5.48%
100%
F Scale
1.11%
K Scale
100%
F(b) Scale

F(b) Scale
1:20%
0%
0%
100%

Inasmuch as each o f the MMPI-2 scales considered in this research were
constructed as validity scales, there was an a priori assumption made by the investigator
that individuals’ scores on one validity scale would be predictive of their scores on the
other validity scales. Said otherwise, if an individual produced an invalid profile on one
validity scale, it was assumed that the other validity scales would reflect this type of
performance as well.
So as to test this assumption, and as a preliminaiy manipulation check on the data
to be used in the subsequent analyses, correlations among the obtained scores on the
MMPI-2 validity scales were computed and are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Pearson Correlations between MMPI-2 Validity Scale Scores
F Scale
Fake Bad
F-K Index
F(b) Scale
Scale
Fake Bad
1.000
.540**
.350**
.515**
Scale
F Scale
1.000
.741**
.809**
F-K Index
1.000
.714**
F(b) Scale
1.000
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
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As assumed, all of these correlations proved to be significant. However, the
strongest correlations were obtained among the F Scale, F(b) Scale and K Scale.
Significant but less robust correlations were obtained between these three validity scales
and the Fake Bad Scale. This may be due to the fact that both the F Scale and the F(b)
Scale consist o f items that are not typically endorsed in normative samples, but are not
necessarily associated with faking bad, while the K Scale tends to evaluate an
individual’s level o f defensiveness and ego strength rather than faking bad per se.(Steh,
2007).
Turning next to the analyses of the actual scores obtained from the validity scales,
starting with the FBS, Table 3 presents the mean, range, and standard deviation for the
Fake Bad Scale scores obtained from the traumatic brain injury group, the somatoform
disorder group, and the malingering group. As can be seen therein, the mean FBS scores
were highest for the malingering group and lowest for the TBI group.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Fake Bad Scale Score
Mean
Minimum
Maximum
TBI
Somatoform
Malingering

17.95
24.74
28.23

8
18
15

23
34
43

Standard
Deviation
4.53
4.40
5.83

Differences among these groups were relevant to the first research question o f how
well the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2 differentiates among those with a traumatic brain
injury, those with a somatoform disorder, and those who are malingering. Recall that it
was expected that the Fake Bad Scale would successfully differentiate between those
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with traumatic brain injuries and those with somatoform disorders or those who were
malingering. However, the FBS was not expected to differentiate well between those
who had a somatoform disorder and those who were malingering.
Once again, these expectations were based upon the working assumption that the
general public is typically quite misinformed regarding the sequelae of traumatic brain
injury, and often believe that physical complaints are more common than psychological
or cognitive complaints, particularly in cases of mild head injury. Thus, it follows that
many malingerers would report more physical complaints than psychological, emotional,
or cognitive complaints. The Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 is heavily weighted with
somatic complaints. While this may help to identify malingerers, it was thought that it
may also increase the risk o f falsely identifying those with a somatoform disorder as
malingering.
In order to determine whether there was an overall statistically significant difference
among the group means for the Fake Bad Scale score, and in order to determine if further,
pairwise comparisons were warranted, a one-way ANOVA was performed. This analysis
yielded the following results: F(df = 2) = 26.177 (p < .001), which indicated that the
mean differences in FBS score shown in Table I among the three groups were
significantly different.
A post hoc Bonferroni comparison was subsequently used to further explore where
between the groups significant score differences were obtained. All of the individual
group comparisons were significantly different as may be seen in Table 4.
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Table 4: Bonferroni Comparison for MMPI-2 Fake Bad Scale Scores Between Groups

FBS Malingering &
Somatoform
FBS Malingering &
TBI
FBS Somatoform &
TBI

Mean Difference
3.49

SE
1.28

Sig.
.024

10.28

1.43

<.001

6.79

1.42

<.001

As hypothesized, the Fake Bad Scale readily and powerfully (p < .001) differentiated
between the traumatic brain injury group and the malingering and somatoform groups.
However, contrary to expectation, the Fake Bad Scale also significantly differentiated,
although less decisively (p=.024), between the malingering group and the somatoform
group. This would suggest, then, that the Fake Bad Scale has utility in differentiating
between malingerers and those with traumatic brain injury or somatoform disorder.
To explore further the differential diagnostic effectiveness of the Fake Bad Scale, the
sensitivity and specificity o f the Fake Bad Scale were calculated. Sensitivity is the
percentage of malingerers that were correctly identified by the scale (that is, fell above
the scale cut off for malingering). A scale is said to be sensitive to the extent that it
correctly measures the construct it was designed to measure. On the other hand, a scale is
said to have specificity to the extent that it differentiates between the construct intended
for measure and other constructs. In other words, the Fake Bad Scale would be said to
have specificity to the extent that nonmalingerers are correctly identified by the scale
(that is, fell b elo w the scale cut o f f for m alingering). The sensitivity o f the Fake Bad

Scale was 76.67%, with 23 of 30 individuals diagnosed with malingering falling above
the cut-off score for this scale.
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The overall specificity for the Fake Bad Scale, when considering individuals in both
the somatoform disorder group and the traumatic brain injury group, was 69.23%, with
36 of 52 non-malingerers falling below the cut-off score for this measure. However,
when these two groups were considered separately, the specificity for the traumatic brain
injury group was 100%, while for the somatoform disorder group the specificity of the
scale was 48.38%. In this somatoform disorder group, 15 of 31 individuals obtained
Fake Bad Scale scores that fell below the cut-off for malingering, which means that 16 of
31 somatoform disordered individuals were diagnosed as malingering based upon their
Fake Bad Scale scores.
Taken together the data obtained for the Fake Bad Scale suggested that based on
group mean scores, the Fake Bad Scale appeared to be successfiil in differentiating
among individuals who were malingering, had a somatoform disorder, or had a traumatic
brain injury, while based on individual scores, the scale seems to effectively differentiate
between malingerers and those with traumatic brain injury but falsely classifies
individuals with somatoform disorders as malingering approximately 50 percent of the
time.
The second research question examined how well the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2
differentiated among traumatic brain injury patients, those with somatoform disorders,
and malingerers compared to other MMPI-2 validity scales, namely the F Scale, the F-K
Index, and the F(b) Scale. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the MMPI-2 validity
scales along with the data for the Fake Bad Scale previously presented in Table 3.
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Table 5 : Descriptive Statistics for MMPI-2 Validity Scales

F
F-K Std.
F(b) F(b) Std.
F Scale
F-K
Index Deviation Scale Deviation
Scale
Std.
Mean
Mean Deviation Mean
TBI
Somatoform
Malingering

56.76
60.35
71.67

10.93
15.13
18.07

-9.19
-9.19
3.33
e-02

11.92
11.17
11.87

56.86
56.55
77.93

16.22
15.81
22.48

Fake Fake Bad
Scale
Bad
Std.
Scale
Mean Deviation
4.53
17.95
24.74
4.40
28.23
5.83

As can be seen from the table, on all four scales that were considered, the
malingering groups had more elevated mean scores than either the somatoform or
traumatic brain injury groups. Also of note is that for the F Scale, F-K Index and F(b)
scales, the mean scores for the TBI and Somatoform groups were reasonably similar
whereas for the Fake Bad Scale the malingering and somatoform group scores were more
comparable than for the TBI group.
In order to determine whether any of these observed mean differences among the
groups were significant for each scale, a separate one-way ANOVA was used to analyze
each MMPI-2 validity scale. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 6 where it
can be seen that the group differences for each validity scale were in fact significant.
Thus, these results indicate that the MMPI-2 validity scales, like the Fake Bad Scale,
successfully differentiated among the three diagnostic groups in terms of mean scores.
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Table 6: One-Way A N Q V A s for MMPI-2 Validity Scales

Fake Bad Scale
F Scale
F-KIndex
F(b) Scale

F(df=2)
26.177
6.881
5.993
12.390

Significance Level
<.001
.002
.004
<.001

A subsequent Bonferroni Comparison was conducted as the results from the one
way ANOVAs were statistically significant. These results are presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Bonferroni Comparisons for MMPl-2 Validity Scales
Mean Difference
FBS Malingering &
3.49
Somatoform
FBS Malingering & TBI
10.28
FBS Somatoform & TBI
6.79
F Malingering &
11.31
Somatoform
F Malingering & TBI
14.90
F Somatoform & TBI
3.59
F-K Malingering &
9.23
Somatoform
F-K Malingering & TBI
9.22
F-K Somatoform & TBI
3.07 e-03
F(b) Malingering &
21.38
Somatoform
F(b) Malingering & TBI
21.088
F(b) Somatoform & TBI
.31

Süg.
.024
<.001
<.001
.016
.003
1.00
.008
.020
1.00
<.001
<.001
1.00

As discussed previously (cf. Table 2) the Bonferroni Comparison indicated that
the Fake Bad Scale significantly differentiated among individuals who were malingering,
individuals with somatoform disorders, and individuals who had incurred a traumatic
brain injury.
In contrast, the MMPl-2 F Scale, F-K Index and F(b) Scale differentiated
significantly between individuals who were malingering and individuals with a
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somatoform disorder as well as between individuals who were malingering and those
with a traumatic brain injury but did not significantly differentiate between individuals
with a somatoform disorder and individuals with a traumatic brain injury.
Sensitivity and specificity was calculated for each of the MMPI-2 validity scales.
This information is presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Sensitivity & Specificity for MMPI-2 Validity Scales.
Specificity
Sensitivity
(Malingerers)
(Somatoform D/O)
76.67%
FBS
48.38%
63.33%
67.74%
F Scale
16.67%
F-K Index
93.55%
73.33%
70.97%
F(b) Scale

Specificity
(TBI)
100%
80.95%
95.24%
71.43%

Again, sensitivity represents the number of malingerers who were correctly
classified by the scale based upon clinical cut-off scores for malingering while specificity
represents the number o f non-malingerers who fell below the clinical cut-off scores for
malingering for each validity scale. As was the case above for the Fake Bad Score, these
data again demonstrate that significant differences in mean scores on a particular scale do
not necessarily indicate that a particular scale has classified an individual correctly by
diagnosis.
The data in Table 8 indicate that, in terms of simple percentages of correct
classifications, the Fake Bad Scale successfully classified individuals w ho were

malingering and individuals with traumatic brain injuries more fi-equently than the other
three validity scales. However, again in terms of simple percentage of correct
classifications, the Fake Bad Scale successfully classified individuals with somatoform
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disorders less frequently than the other MMPI-2 validity scales. Thus, while the Fake
Bad Scale may be effective in differentiating between individuals who are malingering
and those with a traumatic brain injury as well as between those with a somatoform
disorder and those with a traumatic brain injury, when there is a question of whether an
individual is malingering or has a somatoform disorder the Fake Bad Scale may not be
specific in making this distinction.
The F Scale o f the MMPI-2 successfully classified those who were malingering
63.33% of the time, those with a somatoform disorder 67.74% of the time, and those with
a traumatic brain injury 80.95% of the time. Combined with the results from the
Bonferroni comparison, which demonstrated that the F Scale does not successfully
differentiate between the mean scores of individuals with a traumatic brain injury and
those with a somatoform disorder, these percentages likely indicate that, at least some of
the time, individuals with a somatoform disorder are being falsely classified as having a
traumatic brain injury and vice versa. It appears less likely that this scale is falsely
classifying individuals who have a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain injury as
malingering or that those who are malingering are being classified as having a
somatoform disorder or traumatic brain injury, but this is still a possibility with the F
Scale given the modest nature of the percentages of correct classifications.
The F-K Index o f the MMPI-2 correctly classified individuals diagnosed as
malingering only 16.67% o f the time. However, it correctly classified those with
somatoform disorders 93.55% of the time and those with a traumatic brain injury 95.24%
o f the time. This indicates that this particular scale may be falsely classifying
malingerers as having either a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain injury such that
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they do not show significant differences in their mean scores. However, it is unlikely that
the F-K Index is falsely classifying those with a somatoform disorder or a traumatic brain
injury.
Lastly, the F(b) Scale correctly identified individuals who were malingering
73.33% of the time, individuals with a somatoform disorder 70.97% of the time, and
individuals with a traumatic brain injury 71.43% of the time. Like all of the MMPI-2
validity scales examined, with the exception of the Fake Bad Scale, this scale found
overall differences in the mean scores of malingerers and those with a somatoform
disorder and in the scores of malingerers and those with a traumatic brain injury but did
not find overall differences in the scores of individuals with a somatoform disorder
compared to those with a traumatic brain injury. Thus, it is possible that this validity
scale could also incorrectly classify those with a somatoform disorder as having a
traumatic brain injury and vice versa, but it is unlikely that this validity scale classifies
either o f these groups as malingerers or classifies malingerers as either of the other two
diagnostic groups.
Another aspect of the second research question concerned the TOMM. When
compared to the TOMM, the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 was thought likely to do at
least as well at detecting malingering and likely to be less successful at differentiating
among those with somatoform disorders and malingerers. This was predicted because the
TOMM specifically tests for memory, not somatic, malingering. Thus, the TOMM
would likely not produce false positives for those with somatoform disorders.
Unfortunately, an unexpectedly small number of participants (N = 18) were administered
the TOMM. This number was even smaller when only pure somatic and pure memory
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malingerers were considered (N = 2) rather than individuals who had a combined
malingering diagnosis. Therefore, meaningful statistics could not be calculated for this
measure.
The final aspect o f the second research question concerned the Portland Digit
Recognition Test (PDRT). With regard to this measure, which like the TOMM is not
specific to somatic malingering, it was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale of the
MMPI-2 would be likely to perform at least as well as the Portland Digit Recognition
Test at detecting malingering and likely to be less successful at differentiating between
those with somatoform disorders and malingerers. Again, it would be unlikely that the
PDRT would produce false positives for those with somatoform disorders.
As was the case for the TOMM, a very small number of the participants were
administered the PDRT (N - 28). This small number of participants was further
complicated by the fact that two-different versions (Short and Long) of the PDRT were
utilized by the clinician who administered the assessment batteries. Therefore, means
and standard deviations were not calculated for the PDRT but instead, these data were
coded for either being suggestive or not suggestive of malingering.
O f the 28 participants who were administered this measure, 16 were diagnosed as
malingerers. All 16 participants scored above the respective cut-off scores for
malingering on either the short or the long version of the PDRT. There were seven
individuals in the somatoform disorder group who were administered the Portland Digit
Recognition Test, with one individual scoring above the cut-off for malingering. Lastly,
in the traumatic brain injury group, five individuals were administered this measure, and
two fell above the cut-off score for malingering. While no statistical analyses were
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performed on these data, and any generalizations made from them are tenuous at best, the
number o f individuals falling above the cut-off score for malingering in each group
suggested that the PDRT may be unlikely to falsely classify individuals with somatoform
disorders as malingering. However, the PDRT may not be useful in detecting traumatic
brain injury given that nearly half o f the TBI patients who were administered this
measure fell above the cut-off score for malingering.
With regard to the final research question o f whether there were gender differences in
how well the Fake Bad Scale o f the MMPI-2 differentiates among those with traumatic
brain injuries, those with somatoform disorders, and those who are malingering; it was
thought to be unlikely that gender differences would be found. There are different
accepted cut-off scores for this scale for men and women based upon the fact that there
are gender differences in the experience and prevalence o f many of the somatoform
disorders. However, since the comparison o f the three groups in question had not been
previously made, the possibility o f gender differences was examined. Gender differences
were calculated for the overall sample as well as for each of the three groups of interest
utilizing ANOVA. As expected, there were no significant differences with regard to
gender for the overall sample or for any o f the individual groups o f interest as is shown in
Table 9.
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Table 9: Gender Comparisons for Fake 3ad Scale
F
Significance
Fake Bad Scale for All
.281
.598
Groups
.114
Fake Bad Scale for
.738
Malingering Group
.547
Fake Bad Scale for
.466
Somatoform Group
Fake Bad Scale for
.107
.747
Traumatic Brain Injury
Group

83

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The impetus for this research lies in the fact that the diagnosis of malingering can
be a complex and difficult process. While nearly any psychological, neurological, or
physical complaint can be malingered, the present research focused on the malingering of
somatic complaints. Malingering o f somatic complaints is specifically relevant to the
malingering o f traumatic brain injuries inasmuch as most traumatic brain injury
malingerers are typically not well educated regarding the actual sequelae of traumatic
brain injury and fi’equently incorrectly assume that multiple somatic complaints are
associated with a traumatic brain injury (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier,
Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993).
One measure that has been designed specifically to assess the presence of somatic
malingering, particularly among personal injury litigants, is the Fake Bad Scale of the
MMPI-2. The present research was designed to examine the power of the Fake Bad
Scale in terms of differentiating between individuals who had been previously diagnosed
with malingering, those who had been previously diagnosed with a somatoform disorder,
and individuals who had previously been diagnosed as having incurred a traumatic brain
injury.
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By way o f overall summary of the obtained results, the present research found
that the Fake Bad Scale successfully differentiated between individuals who were
malingering, those who had a diagnosed somatoform disorder, and those who had
incurred a traumatic brain injury. In fact, the Fake Bad Scale also successfully
differentiated among all possible paired comparisons of these three groups. However,
when sensitivity and specificity were considered, it became clear that Fake Bad Scale
scores should be interpreted with care when it is a possibility that an individual may have
a somatoform disorder as individuals with this disorder were actually correctly classified
less than 50 percent of the time.
Furthermore, it was found that the Fake Bad Scale is comparable to other MMPI2 validity scales when differentiating among individuals who are malingering, individuals
with a somatoform disorder, and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. The F Scale,
the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale were considered along with the Fake Bad Scale, and it
was found that all o f these scales successfully differentiated among the three groups of
interest. However, when individual paired comparisons were made, only the Fake Bad
Scale successfully differentiated between individuals with a somatoform disorder and
individuals with a traumatic brain injury.
It was hypothesized that the Fake Bad Scale would successfully differentiate
between individuals who were malingering and individuals with a traumatic brain injury
as well as between individuals who had a somatoform disorder and those with a traumatic
brain injury but that the Fake Bad Scale would be less successful at differentiating
between individuals who were malingering and individuals diagnosed with a somatoform
disorder. This hypothesis was based upon the afore mentioned research that indicates
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that individuals frequently incorrectly assume that multiple somatic complaints are
associated with a traumatic brain injury (Gouvier, Prestholdt, & Warner, 1988; Wilier,
Johnson, Rempel, & Linn, 1993) and the fact that the Fake Bad Sale is heavily weighted
with somatic complaints because it is comprised of mainly items from the
Hypochondriasis and Hysteria clinical scales of the MMPI-2 (Groth-Mamat, 1999).
Contrary to prediction, the data obtained in this research indicated that the Fake
Bad Scale successfully differentiated among all three diagnostic groups both in terms of
overall mean scores and pairwise comparisons among the groups.
However, in terms of sensitivity and specificity, the Fake Bad Scale for the most
part correctly classified malingerers, correctly classified those with traumatic brain
injuries 100 percent o f the time but correctly classified those with a somatoform disorder
less than 50 percent of the time. Obviously, when the Fake Bad Scale is utilized in
clinical practice to diagnose malingering, clinicians should carefully consider that this
scale has the potential to falsely classify somatoform disorders as malingerers
approximately 50 percent of the time.
The present research is only somewhat consistent with prior research regarding
the sensitivity and specificity of the Fake Bad Scale, and, in general, provided less
support for the utility of the Fake Bad Scale in the detection of malingering versus
traumatic brain injury. For example, Lees-Haley (1991) found that the Fake Bad Scale
correctly classified individuals as malingering 96 percent o f the time and correctly
identified those with a traumatic brain injury 93 percent of the time. Prior research done
by Miller and Donders (2001) and Martens et al. (2001) found lower rates of specificity
for the Fake Bad Scale. Miller and Donders (2001) found that 50 percent of individuals
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with mild traumatic brain injury who were also involved in litigation or had filed for
complete permanent disability had elevated FBS scores, while Martens et al. found that
22 percent o f these individuals had elevated scores on this scale. Taken together, the
present research found greater specificity with regard to traumatic brain injury
classifications and lower sensitivity with regard to the classification of malingering than
prior research has indicated. Unfortunately, these studies did not consider individuals
with somatoform disorders.
Ross et al. (2004) examined the Fake Bad Scale with regard to its ability to detect
somatoform disorders and found that this particular scale may, in fact, be more successful
at detecting invalid response sets than somatoform disorders. This is consistent with the
current findings, which indicated that the Fake Bad Scale falsely classified individuals
with somatoform disorders approximately 50 percent of the time.
The next hypothesis of the present research was based upon the fact that existing
research had previously examined other MMPI-2 validity scales with regard to their
utility in the detection o f feigning symptoms, including the faking o f head injury
symptoms. This research indicated that several MMPI-2 validity scales, including the F
Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b) Scale were sensitive to overreporting o f symptoms
(e.g.. Butcher, Arbisi, Atlis, & McNulty, 2003; Greiffenstein et al., 2004; Larrabee, 1998;
Berry & Butcher, 1998). It was, therefore, thought appropriate to discern the relative
efficacy o f these validity scales vis a vis the Fake Bad Scale by assessing how well each
scale differentiated between malingerers and other diagnostic groups.
Specifically, the second hypothesis of this study was that the Fake Bad Scale
would be comparable to the MMPI-2 F Scale, MMPI-2 F-K Index, and MMPI-2 F(b)
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Scale in terms o f differentiating between individuals who are malingering and those with
a traumatic brain injury as well as between those who have a somatoform disorder and
those with a traumatic brain injury but would be less successful than the other MMPI-2
validity scales when differentiating between individuals who are malingering and those
with a somatoform disorder.
The data obtained indicated that each of the MMPI-2 validity scales, including the
Fake Bad Scale, successfully differentiated among the three groups o f interest. When
individual pairwise comparisons were considered, the data demonstrated that all o f the
MMPI-2 validity scales successfully differentiated between individuals who were
malingering and those with a somatoform disorder as well as between those who were
malingering and individuals with a traumatic brain injury. However, only the Fake Bad
Scale also significantly differentiated between individuals who had a diagnosed
somatoform disorder and individuals who had incurred a traumatic brain injury. This
indicated that the Fake Bad Scale, as opposed to the F Scale, the F-K Index, and the F(b)
Scale would be the scale o f choice when differentiating between individuals previously
diagnosed with a somatoform disorder and those who had incurred a traumatic brain
injury.
However, as noted above when the sensitivity and specificity for each MMPI-2
validity scale was considered, the Fake Bad Scale demonstrated less utility in the
differential diagnosis of malingering and somatoform disorders. These findings are
inconsistent with prior research by Dearth et al. (2004), which found that most of the
MMPI-2 validity scales had perfect specificity rates but low to moderate sensitivity while
the Fake Bad Scale had both moderate sensitivity and specificity. It is important to note.
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however, that Dearth et al. (2004) compared individuals with moderate to severe brain
injuries to individuals who were either instructed to fake symptoms or to answer honestly
in an analog setting. Thus, genuine malingerers were not included in this particular
study.
Several other studies also compared various MMPI-2 validity scales to the Fake
Bad Scale in terms o f sensitivity and specificity. For example, Larrabee (1998) found the
Fake Bad Scale to be superior to the F Scale in the detection o f malingered head injuries.
Several other studies also found the Fake Bad Scale to be sensitive in this area (e.g.,
Larrabee, 2003a; Tsushima and Tsushima, 2001; Ross et al., 2004). Each of these studies
found the Fake Bad Scale to be superior to other MMPI-2 validity scales in the detection
o f somatic malingering. These findings are quite consistent with the current research in
that the Fake Bad Scale was found to have the greatest specificity in the detection of
malingering.
However, the present research also examined the specificity of the MMPI-2
validity scales with regard to somatoform disorder and traumatic brain injury
classification. Prior research by Ross et al. (2004) found that the Fake Bad Scale may not
be successful in the detection of somatoform disorders. The current research supported
this finding based upon the Fake Bad Scale’s specificity in the detection o f somatoform
disorders. With regard to the other MMPI-2 validity scales that were considered, there
was, in general, variability in the sensitivity and specificity. For example, the F-K Index
exhibited extremely low sensitivity but very high specificity for both somatoform
disorders and traumatic brain injuries while the F(b) Scale was more consistent in terms
of moderate sensitivity and specificity across the diagnostic groups.
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Taken together, these data indicated that no one MMPI-2 validity scale perfectly
predicted diagnostic group membership; rather, each appears to have strengths and
weaknesses in this arena. In general, the F(b) Scale appeared to be the most consistent in
its differential diagnosis across the three groups of interest. However, these findings
indicate that, clinically, it is important not to base a diagnostic decision on any one
measure. Additionally, these findings are inconsistent with prior research that suggested
that the F Scale had the greatest sensitivity in detecting overreporting o f symptoms,
followed by the F-K Index and the F(b) Scale in that order (Ben-Porath, Graham, Hall,
Hirschman, & Zaragoza, 1995).
As far as the present attempt to compare the Fake Bad Scale of the MMPI-2 to the
Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 2002) and to the Portland Digit Recognition
Test (Binder, 1993) there were insufficient numbers of participants who were actually
administered these measures to allow meaningful comparisons. In future research it
would be useful to pursue a comparison of the FBS and these scales. However, these
measures were not specifically designed to detect somatic malingering as the Fake Bad
Scale was. Rather, these measures were designed to measure aspects of cognitive and
memory malingering. Thus, these measures may not compare to the other MMPl-2
validity scales in the same manner as the Fake Bad Scale.
Lastly, it was posited that there would not be gender differences in Fake Bad
Scale scores among the three groups of interest. The data did, in fact, bear this
hypothesis out. This was expected due to the fact that the cutoff scores for this measure
are gender based (Lees-Haley, 1992; Larrabee, 1998).
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Limitations of the Present Study
The present study produced mixed results in support of the Fake Bad Scale’s
utility in the detection o f malingering in that it did produce significantly different mean
scores for each of the three groups of interest as well as the highest rate of sensitivity and
specificity for traumatic brain injuries, but it’s specificity with regard to somatoform
disorders was well below that of other MMPI-2 validity scales. Thus, there should be
significant clinical caution in the use of the Fake Bad Scale in the differential diagnosis
of malingering and somatoform disorders. In general, the F(b) Scale of the MMPI-2 may
be more consistent in its utility in this setting as its sensitivity was similar to the Fake
Bad Scale and it had higher specificity in terms of somatoform disorders.
It should be noted that the strength o f the above conclusions is mitigated
somewhat since there were multiple limitations to the present study. The primary
limitation was that, due to the archival nature of the data, it was impossible to control for
which measures were administered to the participants, which resulted in some measures
having too small of a sample size to report meaningful statistics. Additionally, some
records were missing minor pieces of information that were critical to their being
included in the study. For example, not every record had the participant’s MMPI-2
answer form, which is required for calculating the Fake Bad Scale score. Thus, these
participants had to be excluded fi*om the study reducing the overall sample size.
Another limitation was that the diagnoses were made by only one rater. Although
the clinician who made the diagnoses utilized accepted diagnostic criteria (e.g., DSM-IV;
Slick et al. criteria, 1999), it would still be more desirable to have multiple raters examine
the same data in order to establish interrater reliability.
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Lastly, many participants had been assigned multiple diagnoses. For example, it
was possible for participants to be assigned a diagnosis of a somatoform disorder while
also being diagnosed with malingering of a cognitive deficit. These participants could
have fallen into Slick et al’s (1999) categories of Probable or Possible Malingering.
Ftowever, the present research only considered individuals with a pure diagnosis of
malingering, somatoform disorder, or traumatic brain injury.
The limitations of this study certainly pave the way for future research to be
conducted in this area. It would be of particular interest to establish interrater reliability
for the participants’ diagnoses. Additionally, one could conduct this study over a period
o f time sufficient to allow for administration o f selected measures to ensure that each
participant was administered each measure of interest as well as the same form o f each
measure. However, this would be quite time consuming, and perhaps even impractical,
as it could take many years to diagnose a sufficient number o f individuals in each of the
three categories. Another area of future research would be to include individuals with
Probable or Possible Malingering (Slick et al, 1999), or to include those with multiple
overlapping diagnoses of interest, to determine how the validity scales, and the FBS in
particular, differentiate among these diagnoses.
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Gender: Male
Age: 22
Diagnosis: Somatoform Disorder
Tests Administered: Lateral Dominance Examination, Grip Strength Examination,
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Trail Making Test Parts A & B,
Reitan-Klove Sensory Perceptual Examination, Tactile Finger Recognition Test,
Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (Logical Memory Subtests I & II, Visual Reproduction
Subtests I & II), Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised ( Abbreviated Battery), Wide
Range Achievement Test-3, MMPI-2, MCMI-III, Bender Gestalt Visual-Motor Test,
Clinical Interview
Background Information: An object the size of a small forklift fell onto subjects head
in occipital area. Mental status alert and oriented. Possible fractures of cervical and
thoracic spine. Laceration to scalp in occipital area (3 cm on left parietal region).
Glasgow Coma Scale =15. No loss of consciousness in accident. X-Rays showed a
“gaping at approximately C6 on the left with a questionable facet fracture or locked facet
on the right...Computerized tomography...[revealed] a facet fracture on the right,
possible ligamentous injury on the left at the level of C6.” All other x-rays normal.
Neurological examination showed “motor and sensory present in all four extremities;
however, he did complain of pain radiating down to the chest and down between his
scapulae.”
Patient Interview: Trouble reading, speech difficulties in elementary school. Some
experimentation with drugs as a teen, but denies using drugs currently or having
difficulties with alcohol. Asthma as a child. Paranoid thoughts and one-time psychotic
symptom (hearing voice o f uncle). Post-accident symptoms: neck pain, back pain,
wearing a soft collar, numbness in right side of body, headaches, significant sleep
disturbance, sharp or throbbing pain in neck and back, depressed, ruminations about
unfairness of work situation, anxiety about going to work, suicidal thoughts.
Test Results: Tests from Halstead-Reitan Battery scored using Heaton, Grant, &
Matthews Comprehensive Norms for an Expanded Halstead-Reitan Batterv (199IT
SUBTEST
Grip Strength
Right
Left

Finger-Tapping Test
Right
Left

RAW SCORE

T SCORE

IMPAIRMENT

23.5 kg
25.5 kg

13
23

M oderate to Severe

51 taps
49.5 taps

44
51

Below Avg./Normal
Average
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Severe

Grooved Pegboard
Right
Left

65 sec.
67 sec.

47
46

Average
Average

Trail Making Test
Part A
Part B

33 sec.
74 sec.

39
44

Mild
Below Avg./Normal

WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE REVISED
SUBTEST
Information
Digit Span
Arithmetic
Similarities
Picture Completion
Block Design
Digit Symbol

AGE COHORT SCALED SCORE
8
8
6
9
10
8
6

A C %ILE
25
25
9
37
50
25
9

Prorated Verbal IQ = 88 (low average)
Prorated Performance IQ = 86 (low average)
Prorated Full Scale IQ = 86 (low average)
W ECHSLER MEMORY SCALE - REVISED
SUBTEST
Logical Memory I
Logical Memory II
Visual Reproduction I
Visual Reproduction II

PERCENTILE
34
53
86
93

MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY -2
Welsh Code New 8**27i6*340” ’+9-5/F***’” +L/:K#
Fake Bad Scale Score = 30 (Above Cut-Off Score for Malingering)
F = 23 (T = 107)
F-K = 1 4 (Raw)
F(b) = 12 (T = 92)
WIDE RANGE ACHIEVEMENT TEST -3
SUBTEST
Reading
Spelling
Arithmetic

STANDARD SCORE
84
75
82
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%ILE
14
5
12

GRADE
7
5
6

M ILLON CLINICAL MULTIAXIAL INVENTORY - III
BASE RATE
79
78
77
82
75
88
95
82
75

SCALE
Schizoid
Avoidant
Depressive
Negativistic
Masochistic
Anxiety Disorder
Somatoform Disorder
Dysthymic Disorder
Major Depression
DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSIONS; (DSM-IV)
AXIS I:

(296.23)
(307.89)

(316.0)

(315)

AXIS II:

MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER, SINGLE EPISODE,
SEVERE WITHOUT PSYCHOTIC FEATURES
PAIN DISORDER ASSOCIATED WITH BOTH
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS AND A GENERAL
MEDICAL CONDITION
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS (PERSONALITY
TRAITS AND COPING STYLE) AFFECTING
MEDICAL CONDITION
READING AND SPELLING DISORDERS (PRE
EXISTING)

AVOIDANT, PARANOID, AND PASSIVE/AGGRESSIVE FEATURES
(PREEXISTING)

AXIS III:

PER PHYSICIANS

AXIS IV:

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STRESSORS: WORKRELATED STRESS AND MARITAL STRESS

AXIS V:

GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONING: MODERATE
SYMPTOMS

Accident did not cause abnormal brain functioning according to medical records, no
neuropsychological dysfunction, placed enough stress on already weak personality
structure to cause a major depressive episode and a pain disorder, his experience of pain
is greater than objective symptoms would suggest
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Gender: Female
Age: 71
Diagnosis: Malingering
Tests Administered: Record Review, Clinical Interview of Patient and
Collateral, Portland Digit Recognition Test, Seashore Rhythm Test, Speech
Sounds Perception Test, Reitan-KIove Sensory Perceptual Examination, Tactile
Finger Recognition Test, Finger-Tip Number Writing Perception Test, Tactile
Form Recognition Test, Tactual Performance Test, Grip Strength Examination,
Manual Finger Tapping Test, Grooved Pegboard Test, Bender Visual-Motor
Gestalt: 5-Second Delay, Copy, and 30-Minute Delay Components, Trails A & B,
Short Category Test Booklet Format, WMS-R, WAIS-R, WRAT-3, MCMI-II,
MMPI-2, BAI, BDI
Background Information: Prior history of heart problems; has a pacemaker.
Incident in question involved patient being “shocked” by a videogame machine.
Patient reported being shocked in the right hand and feeling it go into her
pacemaker. Had an episode of “violent shaking” and went unconscious. Later
regained consciousness. Hospital reports indicated that patient had spilled liquid
while playing the videogame machine. ER diagnosis = pacemaker malfunction,
rule out myocardial infarct. No entrance or exit wound from electric shock
present. Reports indicate that patient “fell about two feet off the ground [after
shock] and later went into ventricular fibrillation.” One doctor noted that she is
“confused all the time with a lack of concentration and forgetfulness.” Patient
reported “it is as if there is pressure all over the head and into the ears, and this is
constant all the time.”

One doctor reported that it was difficult for patient to recall her home address, she
did not know her date of birth, her telephone number, or zip code, she could only
remember the most recent two presidents, could only remember the month due to
a holiday, knew the year but could not recall the day or date. Patient could not
recall important historical facts (i.e., Kennedy’s assassination. Pearl Harbor) and
could not subtract 7 from 100. Diagnosis = “Post-electrical shock with
impairment of memory and confusion, etiology to be discussed.” Suggested CT
Scan to rule out subdural hematoma.
Patient Interview: Patient unable to or was purposely not answering very simple
questions concerning personal information, so clinician’s ability to gather a valid
and reliable developmental, educational, and family history was affected. Patient
could not state her correct age. Patient reported that she has had a profound
memory loss since the accident. Patient very clearly remembered the day o f the
accident, including nearly every activity she engaged in on that day in a very
specific manner. Patient also had slip-ups in her description of her problems,
which she would try to cover in up in a very unsophisticated manner (e.g., “I
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remember.. .well, I don’t really remember but so many people have told me that I
did [whatever activity she was discussing].”).
An interview with a collateral source that is very close to the patient was also
conducted. He stated that the patient’s biggest problem since the accident is “loss
of memory”, which he described as “She cannot remember certain things of the
past and other things she can remember.” Stated that these problems began right
after the accident. Also stated that the memory disturbance has been gradually
getting worse since the accident. Other complaints: no longer spells as well, lost a
lot o f hair, bowel obstructions, further heart problems, cataracts, collapsing veins
all over patient’s body.
Test Results:
HALSTEAD-REITAN TEST BATTERY
TEST
RAW SCORE
RATING
TFR-R
18.27 sec.
TFR-L
31.08 sec.
TPT-R
8 min. 48 sec.
TPT-L
18 min. 5 sec.
6 min. 6 sec.
TPT-B
TPT-Tot. Time 32 min. 59 sec.
4
TPT-Mem.
TPT- Local. I
G rip -R
27.5 kg.
G rip -L
16 kg.
T a p -R
40.8 taps
T a p -L
26 taps
P eg -R
86 sec.
P e g -L
180 sec.
Severe
26 sec.
Trails A
374 sec.
Trails B
Severe
S. Rhythm
24 Correct
SSPT
8 errors
Category
102 errors

Halstead Impair

T SCORE

1.0

110

IMPAIRMENT

43
26
49
40
47
43
39
48
55
40
48
30
42
24

Below Avg.
Moderate
Average
Below Avg.
Average
Below Avg.
Mild
Average
Above Avg.
Below Avg.
Average
Mild to Mod.
Below Avg.
Mod. to

63
24

Above Avg.
Mod. to

48
44
38

Average
Below Avg.
Mild

25

Moderate

W AIS-R
AGE

SUBTEST
AGE CORRECTED SCALED
CORR.%ILE
Information
8
8
Digit Span
10
Vocabulary
7
Arithmetic
Comprehension
9
Similarities
12
Picture Completion
8
9
Picture Arrangement
Block Design
13
Object Assembly
9
Digit Symbol
11
Verbal IQ
93
Performance IQ
97
93
Full Scale IQ

25
25
50
16
37
75
25
37
84
37
63
32
42
32

W M S-R
INDEX
STANDARD
Verbal Mem.
Visual Mem.
General Mem.
Attention/Concentration
Delayed Recall

SCORE
81
122
96
87
103

%ILE
10
93
39
19
58

PORTLAND DIGIT RECOGNITION TESTU

Easy Correct = 14 (Below cut-off of 19)
Hard Correct =13 (Below cut-off of 18)
Total Correct = 27 (Below cut-off of 39)
♦♦Present performance falls below 1®‘ percentile^^
WRAT-3
SUBTEST
GRADE
Reading
Spelling
Arithmetic
INVALID

RAW

STANDARD

42
36
INVALID

96
94
INVALID

%ILE

39
34
INVALID

BECK ANXIETY INVENTORY ; Raw Score = 8, within normal limits

I II

HS
7

BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY;
depressive symptoms.

Raw Score = 16; Mild subjective

MMPI-2
Fake Bad Scale = 25
F = 55
K = 65
F-K = -10
F(b) = 46
Code Type = 3-0
o Very rare code type; usually describe self as very conventional and
law-abiding; few, vague physical ailments; fearful and frequently
phobic; unlikely to be psychotic

DIAGNOSTIC IMPRESSIONS: (DSM-IV)
AXIS I:

V65.2
293.89
293.83

3 16

293.0

AXIS II:

MALINGERING (OF CURRENT MEMORY
DISTURBANCE)
ANXIETY D /0 DUE TO MULT. MED. COND.
MOOD D/O W/DEP. FEAT. DUE TO MULT.
MED.
COND.
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYMPT. AFFECTING
MULT.
MED. COND.
DELIRIUM DUE TO ACUTE CARDIAC
ABNORMALITY, RESOLVED

HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY FEATURES

AXIS III:
SEVERAL PRE- AND POST-ACCIDENT PHYSICAL
PROBLEMS
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS PRE-ACCIDENT:
• MENTAL REACTION TO A RASH OUT OF
PROPORTION TO SYMPTOMS
• VALIUM PRESCRIPTION ACCOMPANIED BY
CHEST PAIN
• PATIENT EXTREMELY NERVOUS; GIVEN
VALIUM

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS POST-ACCIDENT:
• CONFUSION, EVEN ON VERY BASIC INFO.,
LACK OF CONCENTRATION
• “POSSIBILITY OF FUNCTIONAL OVERLAY”

112

•

CHEST PAIN, UNUSUAL, DON’T MATCH
CLASSIC PATTERN EXPECTATION
ANXIOUS, TEARFUL, DEMANDING
SEVERE ANXIETY?
VIOLENT MOOD SWINGS
HEADACHE, SHAKY, NERVOUS
PROZAC FOR DEPRESSION
“MULTIPLE PSYCHOSOMATIC SYMPTOMS,
PERIODS OF DEPRESSION AND MOOD
SWINGS

AXIS IV: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS:
HEALTH
PROBLEMS IN FAMILY
AXIS V:

GAF: 63
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